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1. Introduction 
In contrast to the well-known gender gaps favoring men in the labor market, a growing number 
of studies document a criminal justice system gender gap – especially at the sentencing stage – 
that treats females more leniently than males.1 Most dramatically, Starr (2015) finds that male 
defendants in U.S. Federal Courts receive 63% longer sentences than females, even after 
conditioning on observable case characteristics. Similar gender gaps are seen in the English 
justice system – the subject of the current paper – today. 2 Besides the fundamental question of 
whether the courts apply equal standards across defendants of different characteristics, 
understanding the determinants of judicial decisions (including defendant gender) is important 
given the potential social and economic effects of criminal justice system interactions on both 
the defendant and other members of society. 
The current paper contributes to the understanding of the modern-day criminal justice 
gender gap by studying its evolution in a dynamic period spanning the 18th and 19th centuries 
(1715-1900) and almost 200,000 trials at the Old Bailey Central Criminal Court of London. 
Our data come from The Proceedings of the Old Bailey, which were published after each 
monthly court session. This unique data source has since been digitized by The Old Bailey 
Proceedings Online, and includes (tagged) information identifying the case, session date, 
defendant’s name and gender, detailed offense categories (more than 20 of which are non-
distinctly male or female), as well as verdict and sentencing outcomes. The first part of the 
paper describes the gender gaps over time, while the second part demonstrates that these 
persistent gaps cannot be explained by observable (and proxies for unobservable) case 
differences. The final part of the paper, therefore, considers the role of discrimination, and 
exploits the dynamically changing sanction regimes to test for taste-based discrimination in the 
form of paternalism.  
First, we document the evolution in the raw and adjusted gender gaps in jury convictions 
and judge sentences. Though descriptive in nature, this analysis makes two important 
contributions: (i) this is the first study of the dynamics of the gender gap over an extended 
period (let alone 200 years)3 and (ii) one of the few studies of gender gaps in multiple stages of 
                                                 
1 See Blau and Kahn’s (2017) review of the U.S. gender wage gap and Altonji and Blank (1999).  
2 Depending on the offense, men in England and Wales in 2009 were between 1.1 and 3.2 times more likely to be 
sentenced to immediate custody than women, and the average male to female sentence length ratio is less than one 
for just one of ten crime categories (criminal damage). Sentencing statistics are calculated from the data underlying 
a Ministry of Justice publication, Sentencing Statistics England and Wales 2009. See Tables 2i and 
2j.http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140712021330/https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/sen
tencing-statistics-annual-ns. Sourced from the National Archives on August 23, 2017. 
3 Most existing research focuses on modern-day static snapshots in U.S. federal court data (Starr, 2015; Mustard, 
2001; Schanzenbach, 2005; Sorensen et al., 2012), state courts (see Butcher et al.’s (2017) analysis of Kansas) and 
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the criminal justice system for the same sample of defendants.4 The main finding is that a 
significant conviction gap favoring females persists throughout the entire time period. Relative 
to the mean conviction rate, the gap declines until around 1850 and then increases again. 
Second, generalizing the sentencing patterns, we see that females are less likely to be sentenced 
to a particular punishment when there are more lenient sentencing options available. 
Conversely, females are relatively more likely to be sentenced to a particular punishment than 
males if that punishment was not the most severe available. Moreover, we find little (to no) 
evidence that the gender gap is explained by differences in observable case characteristics or 
even unobservable differences (as proxied by the number of words per case in the Proceedings).  
What explains the historical criminal justice gender gap? The second part of the paper 
assesses the potential importance of taste-based discrimination by taking advantage of the 
dynamic nature of the criminal justice system during the 18th and 19th centuries. We use 
variation in punishment severity induced by three criminal justice ‘reforms’, as the society 
transitioned from relying on both transportation to a penal colony in the Americas and capital 
punishment in the mid-1700s to primarily incarceration by 1900. We treat the American 
Revolution in 1776 as the first natural ‘experiment’: Prior to the Revolution, about 70% of 
convicted defendants were sentenced to transportation to the Americas. The unexpected loss of 
the American penal colony resulted in a crisis in England, with a temporary (10-year) solution 
of incarcerating offenders in the hulks of boats on the River Thames until a new penal colony 
was established in Australia in 1786. Moreover, this led to the introduction of imprisonment as 
a sentence, which did not completely disappear upon the reinstatement of transportation. The 
second ‘experiment’ is the offense specific abolition of capital punishment from 1807 to 1856, 
and corresponding sharp rise in the prison population. Finally, penal transportation to Australia 
was largely abolished in 1853 (and completely in 1857). Are males and females differentially 
affected by these sentencing reforms, in a way which is consistent with an all-male judiciary 
protecting the ‘weaker’ sex, i.e. engaging in paternalism?  
A consistent pattern emerges in our empirical analyses of each sentencing ‘reform’. First, 
we see that the pre-Revolution gender gap in convictions decreases with the evolution of prison 
                                                 
other countries like France (Philippe, forthcoming). There is limited research on historical criminal justice gender 
gaps. One exception is Bodenhorn (2009), who finds females received shorter sentences in 19th century 
Pennsylvania. The focus of the paper was not on gender, however, as they comprised just 4% of the 10,000 
individuals sentenced. Vickers (2016) considers the effect of social status on sentencing for males in 19th century 
England and Wales.  
4 An exception is Starr (2015), who studies charges, convictions and sentencing. Most previous research focused 
on just sentencing (Sorensen et al., 2012; Mustard, 2001; and Schanzenbach, 2005) or earlier stages, such as arrest 
(Stolzenberg and D’Alessio, 2004) and plea bargaining (Spohn and Spears, 1997 and Shermer and Johnson, 2010). 
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as a sentencing option. That is, the gender gap in convictions decreases as the minimum 
expected punishment decreases. In terms of sentencing, we find that during the temporary halt, 
transportation eligible offenses are shifted mainly into prison/prison hulks and corporal 
punishment; during the new transportation to Australia/prison regime, a significant increase in 
sentences to prison and corporal punishment is observed compared to the pre-Revolution 
period. Most importantly for testing for preference-based discrimination, we find that convicted 
females are disproportionately more likely (14 percentage points) to be shifted into prison 
during both the temporary halt and new post period. We argue that these changes represent jury 
and judge preferences, and not simply constraints (e.g. prison hulks excluding females), since 
females were also shifted out of corporal punishment, which is not capacity constrained. 
Similarly, abolishing the death penalty nearly eliminated the pre-existing gender gaps in 
conviction. For violent offenses, the 12-percentage point gap in the chance of conviction is 
almost completely offset by the abolition of capital punishment. For property crimes, the gender 
gap in conviction of a lesser charge (about 5 percentages points) is offset by the reform. There 
is also some evidence that convicted females are disproportionately shifted out of transportation 
(as it becomes the new harshest punishment) with the abolition of capital punishment. 
Finally, as transportation was abolished in 1853, prison became the new harshest 
punishment. Our empirical analysis shows that the abolition of transportation differentially 
affected the sentencing of females to prison in a similar way as the earlier reforms. Before 1853, 
females were about five percentage points more likely to be sentenced to prison; after 1853, 
females were three percentage points less likely.  
Taken together, the differential responses of juries and judges to changes in punishment 
severity for male and female defendants, protecting females from the harshest available 
punishment, provides strong support of taste-based discrimination in the form of paternalism 
as the underlying source of the criminal justice gender gaps. Though these ‘experiments’ had 
local effects on the size of the gender gap, they were, in general, not strong enough to offset the 
persistence of the gaps over time. Our conclusion regarding taste-based discrimination is in line 
with the fact that the one ‘constant’ throughout this period is the perception of females as the 
weaker sex. Further evidence of discrimination as the underlying source of the gender gap is 
provided by our analysis of the relationship between witnesses and conviction rates. 
Specifically, we find that conditional on observables, two prosecutorial witnesses are needed to 
convict females at the same rate as males with just one such witness, suggesting that prosecutors 
face a higher bar in terms of evidence quality for female defendants. Though such finding is 
consistent with the overall notion of discrimination, it does not allow us to disentangle taste-
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based and statistical discrimination. The bottom line is that though we provide strong empirical 
and anecdotal evidence in favor of taste-based discrimination, we cannot empirically rule out 
that statistical discrimination also plays a role. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides institutional details 
about historical trials at the Old Bailey Central Criminal Court and describes the Proceedings 
trial data. Section 3 uses the Old Bailey data to illustrate changes in the (gender) composition 
of cases and sentencing policy from 1715 to 1900. Section 4 traces out the raw gender gaps in 
convictions and sentencing over time. Section 5 presents regression adjusted results, and 
considers the extent to which observable case characteristics can explain the gaps. Section 6 
exploits the dynamic changes in sentencing policy to assess the importance of taste-based 
discrimination. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. The Old Bailey and the Proceedings 
This paper studies the gender gap in nearly 200 years of trials from the Central Criminal Court 
of London and Middlesex – the Old Bailey. The details of all cases were preserved in The 
Proceedings of the Old Bailey, which were published after each court session from 1674 to 
1913 (only reliable after 1715). These records have since been digitized by The Old Bailey 
Proceedings Online (Hitchcock et al., 2013) and are available as tagged xml files. This section 
provides a brief overview of Old Bailey trials, this unique data source, and our sample creation.  
 
2.1. Trials at the Old Bailey  
The jurisdiction of the Old Bailey initially included felonies in London and the surrounding 
county of Middlesex, but expanded in the 1830s with the addition of Essex. The definition of a 
felony during this period was not the same as today; offenses like pickpocketing, shoplifting, 
and assault, were observed at the Old Bailey, and were even capital for some of the period.  
Of course, a sample of Old Bailey trials is still ‘selected’ in nature. The trials represent 
offenses reported by victims, arrested by police (after the 1829 introduction of the Met), charged 
by the magistrates, and deemed to have sufficient evidence by a Grand Jury to proceed. All of 
these decisions are unobserved in our data; our analysis is conditional on a case reaching ‘trial’ 
at the Old Bailey. It is certainly plausible (and even likely) that gender gaps exist in these earlier 
decisions. To the extent that they do, however, our analysis is likely to underestimate the overall 
criminal justice gender gap, as there is little reason to think that such earlier stage gaps do not 
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follow the same underlying motives as the conviction and sentencing decisions studied here.5  
The Old Bailey trials were organized in sessions lasting at least a few days, during which 
a London or Middlesex specific jury decided many consecutive cases.6 During this period, 12 
jurors were randomly chosen from a pool of potential jurors who were male, aged 21 to 60 (for 
most of the period), resided in England and met income/wealth qualifications.7 After the 
testimonies, the seated jury had to reach a unanimous verdict, the most common of which were 
acquittal, guilty, or guilty of a lesser offense. The judge decided the sentence (but the jury could 
recommend mercy). The main role played by women in the criminal justice system during the 
1700s and 1800s was defendant. All decision makers (jurors, judges, attorneys) were male. This 
began to change with the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919 (after our sample period). 
 
2.2. Data Description: The Proceedings of the Old Bailey (1715-1900) 
Initially meant to entertain readers with detailed transcripts of the most colorful cases, the 
Proceedings gained quasi-official (subsidized) status in the late 1700s. All trials were covered 
approximately equally, as the City of London demanded a ‘true, fair, and perfect narrative’.8  
From the xml files, we extracted ‘tagged’ information identifying the unique case, session date, 
defendant’s name, gender and age (only available for convicted defendants after 1800), the 
offense as well as the verdict (plea, guilty of original or lesser charge, acquit) and sentences 
(death, transportation, prison, corporal, miscellaneous or no punishment). Even if defendants 
are charged with multiple offenses, only the main (most serious) offense is tagged in the 
Proceedings Online. We categorize defendants as being guilty of any charge or guilty of this 
original (most serious) charge versus a lesser charge. All co-defendants can be linked to the 
same unique case. We manually coded (i) judge, jury and juror names from 1750 to 1822 and 
(ii) defendant ‘criminal history’ from the 1830s onwards. The latter is in the form of untagged 
symbols (e.g. * or +), indicating the defendant’s previous custodial history (once, more than 
once, or known associate of bad character). As such a record was uncommon, we simply 
classify defendants as having any known history at the time of the trial.  
Appendix Table 1 lists the 34 detailed offenses in the initial data and the number of 
observations and share of female defendants from 1715 to 1900 for each offense. To study a 
within-offense gender gap, we drop distinctly male (animal theft, embezzlement, mail theft, 
                                                 
5 Thus, conditioning our analysis on observed jury trials may underestimate the full extent of gender gaps in the 
criminal justice system. However, the fact that we look at both convictions and sentencing (and conduct robustness 
tests to including pleas) is already an improvement on modern-day studies of the gender gap in just sentencing. 
6 See Bindler and Hjalmarsson’s (forthcoming) analysis of the path dependency of consecutive jury decisions. 
7 For more details, see e.g. Beatie (1986) for the Jury Act of 1730 and Bentley (1998) for the Juries Act of 1825. 
8 One exception is 1790-1792 when only convictions were reported. We exclude these years from our analysis. 
6 
 
rape, sexual assault, and sodomy) and  female (infanticide) offenses; the nature of these offenses 
are gender specific and/or the share of female defendants is generally less than 5% (or more 
than 95%) in almost all sub-periods.9 We also drop offenses with few observations and those 
classified as ‘missing’ or ‘other’, which contain a wide range of not necessarily comparable 
offenses. We retain a final sample of 23 detailed offenses, which we categorize as property, 
violent, fraud or other, and 192,701 trials over this approximately 200-year period.10 As in 
Bindler and Hjalmarsson (2018), we also identified the capital eligibility of each offense.  
Columns (1) – (3) of Table 1 provide summary statistics overall and by defendant gender 
for the whole period. Approximately 23% of cases had female defendants, 22% were capital, 
75% were property offenses, and 13% included a guilty plea. The four main sentences were: 
death (7%), transportation to the Americas or Australia (30%), prison (51%), and corporal 
punishment (4%). The next section uses these data to illustrate dramatic changes over the 
sample period with respect to both the composition of cases and the predominant sanctions.  
 
3. Criminal Justice Reforms and Institutional Changes at the Old Bailey (1715 – 1900) 
3.1. Gender and Case Composition at the Old Bailey 
Panel A of Figure 1 presents the annual number of cases by offense category, and provides a 
number of important details about trials at the Old Bailey over this time period. First, property 
offenses comprise the largest offense category throughout the period. During the 18th century 
and the latter half of the 19th century, there are generally less than 750 property trials per year, 
but far fewer violent, fraud and other offenses. During the 1800s, there is a large increase in the 
number of property crime trials from a low of 584 in 1804 to a high of 2,847 in 1843, which 
may due to both expanding catchment areas and the vast population growth during this period.11 
This is followed by a sharp decline (of almost 80%) over the next 10 years; by 1852, there were 
only 575 property offense trials. King (2006) suggests that this decline in property crimes can 
be attributed to jurisdictional changes shifting some of the less serious offenses to the lower 
courts or the decision-making burden for some crimes (e.g. non-violent property) away to the 
                                                 
9 There was a shift in attitudes towards female sexuality from the 18th century woman being thought to be ruled by 
her emotions and body to the expectation that the 19th century woman was the angel of the household. With this 
shift came increased concern about prostitution. In 1857, the Met Police estimated there to be 8600 prostitutes and 
2825 brothels (Acton, 1857). These attitudes are unlikely to influence our analysis since (i) prostitution is not 
trialed at the Old Bailey, (ii) we exclude gender specific offenses, and (iii) consider the within-offense gender gap. 
10 Property offenses include arson, burglary, housebreaking, larceny (combined), pickpocketing, receiving, 
shoplifting, stealing from master, theft from place; violent offenses include assault, manslaughter, murder, robbery 
(combined) and wounding; fraud offenses include coining offences, forgery and fraud; other offenses include 
bigamy, libel, perjury, perverting justice, return from transportation and riot. 
11 London’s population increased from about 750,000 in 1760 to over one million in 1801 to seven million in 1911. 
See https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/static/Population-history-of-london.jsp, viewed on August 30, 2017. 
7 
 
magistrates. Thus, a second take away from Panel A of Figure 1 is that the proportion of 
property crime trials at the Old Bailey is changing over time; it is increasing until 1843, sharply 
decreases in the 1840s, and is then followed by a gradual decline from 1850 to 1900 (as the 
number of property trials decrease and violent and fraud trials increase). One potential 
implication of this is that the increase in violent offense trials and the shift of minor property 
crimes out of the Old Bailey results in a sample of post-1850 trials at the Old Bailey that are, 
on average, for relatively more serious offenses than those in earlier years. 
 Panels B-D of Figure 1 display the annual number of male and female cases (left-hand 
axis) as well as the share of female defendants (right-hand axis) overall and for property and 
violent offenses, respectively. The share of female defendants trialed at the Old Bailey declines 
throughout the sample period, from around 40% in the early 1700s to around 10% in 1900; this 
is driven by property offenses, for which an even larger decrease in the share female is seen. In 
contrast, the female share for violent crimes fluctuates around 10% for most of the sample 
period. Finally, the declining share of females for property crimes from 1750 until the mid-
1800s is driven by an increasing number of male defendants more than by a decreasing number 
of female defendants, while the subsequent decrease in the share is driven mainly by the latter.12  
 
3.2. Sentencing Reforms at the Old Bailey 
This section describes the evolution of the three largest types of sanctions (death penalty, 
transportation, and prison) at the Old Bailey and highlights the sentencing analyzed in Section 
5. Figure 2 illustrates the dramatic changes in the English penal system between 1715 and 1900. 
Panel A shows the share of each type of sentence for all offenses, while Panels B and C consider 
property and violent offenses, respectively. In each figure, the solid, long-dashed, and short-
dashed black lines correspond to death, transportation, and prison sentences, respectively. We 
also plot the share of trials eligible for capital punishment in each figure. We characterize our 
sample period (1715-1900) by four sentencing regimes, which are clearly visible in Figure 2.  
The first sentencing period includes the years prior to the American Revolution in 1776 
(denoted by the first red vertical line). Prior to the Revolution, around 70% of defendants overall 
were annually sentenced to transportation to the Americas (Panel A), though Panels B and C 
                                                 
12 This declining share of female defendants at the Old Bailey has certainly been recognized by historians studying 
this period; see the Old Bailey website (https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/static/Gender.jsp#gendercrime). There 
is, however, a lack of agreement about the underlying reasons for this trend in female representation at the Old 
Bailey, and the extent to which it is representative of other courts. Feeley and Little (1991) argue that it represents 
a real decline in female criminality while King (2006) argues that it is more likely to be driven by fluctuations due 
to times of war and peace and changing jurisdictions, especially in the second half of the 1800s. To the best of our 
knowledge, however, our study is the first to shed light on how the gender gap in outcomes changes with this 
changing composition. 
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show that about 80% of property versus less than 20% of violent crime trials resulted in 
transportation. Rather, the predominant sentence for violent crimes during this period was the 
death penalty (between 70 and 80%). Moreover, prior to the Revolution, prison was virtually 
non-existent as a sentence; the few existing prisons were primarily used as temporary holding 
cells for either pre-trial detention or convicted inmates awaiting transportation or death. The 
Revolution abruptly and unexpectedly brought a halt to this sentencing regime. The lack of a 
large prison infrastructure combined with the loss of the American penal colonies in 1776 led 
to a penal crisis in England: what should be done with convicted (property crime) offenders?  
The temporary solution was to hold male convicts (females were not allowed) in the hulks 
of ships and put them to hard labor dredging the Thames River (Hulks Act of 1776). This 
represents the second sanction regime and corresponds to the sharp spike in ‘prison’ sentences 
immediately after 1776, from almost 0% to more than 40%, in Figure 2. This shock was more 
salient for property than violent crimes, given the relative importance of transportation. 
Transportation was reinstated in 1786 with the establishment of a penal colony in 
Australia, marking the beginning of our third sentencing regime (see the second red vertical 
line in Figure 2). Transportation levels jumped sharply but never returned to the pre-Revolution 
levels. Rather, for the next 50 years, they stayed fairly steady with an approximate 40% (20%) 
sentencing share for property (violent) crimes. Transportation “beyond the seas” to Australia 
was particularly harsh (more-so than the Americas) given the length of the voyage, the 
significant chance of illness or death, and hard labor and strict discipline upon arrival. 
Transportation was abolished with the Penal Servitude Acts of 1853, which shifted 7-year 
transportation sentences into four years of penal servitude, and 1857, which abolished even 
longer transportation sentences. Transportation sentences drop virtually to zero after the 1853 
Act (marked by the third vertical red line); there is little bite from the 1857 Act.  
This third sentencing regime (from 1786 through the early 1850s) is the most dynamic. 
Though the share transported to Australia remains fairly stable, there are significant changes in 
both the use of prison and capital punishment. First, prison sentences never returned to their 
pre-Revolution level of 0%; rather, they remained at about 20% (10%) for property (violent) 
crimes. Second, the share of prison sentences began to increase in the 1820s, such that it 
represented more than 70% of sentences when transportation was abolished. Third, the rise of 
prison can largely be attributed to the abolition of capital punishment, which happened 
gradually (offense by offense) throughout this period, as reflected in the share of capital-eligible 
trials at the Old Bailey. At the beginning of the period (1786), almost 40% (100%) of the 
property (violent) crime trials were capital. By 1838, none of the property offenses (with the 
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exception of arson) and less than 10% of the violent crime trials were capital. See Bindler and 
Hjalmarsson (2018) for details on the year of abolition for each offense category. The abolition 
of capital punishment was particularly salient for violent crimes: after 1837 (when several 
offenses became non-capital), a sharp decrease in death sentences (from more than 60% to less 
than 5%) was offset by a sharp increase in prison sentences (from less than 20% to almost 70%). 
Thus, the third sentencing regime is characterized by transportation to Australia, the rise of 
prisons and the abolition of capital punishment.  
This brings us to the fourth (and final) sentencing regime. By the time transportation is 
abolished, a new steady-state had emerged, in which incarceration was the predominant 
sanction for both property (more than 90%) and violent offenses (more than 80%). Of course, 
prison sentences for violent and property offenses could differ along the intensive margin, i.e. 
sentence length, but unfortunately this is not observed in the data. 
The second part of the paper analyzes the effect of these sentencing reforms on the criminal 
justice gender gap in three natural experiments that change punishment severity, keeping in 
mind that each of these reforms were more/less relevant for property versus violent crimes.  
   
3.3. Verdicts at the Old Bailey 
Juries could convict the defendant of the original most serious charge, convict of a lesser charge, 
or acquit. Their ability to convict of a lesser charge depends on whether a suitable lesser charge 
existed; this was more common for property crimes, which are a function of the value of the 
property, than for violent crimes. Figure 3 plots the share of defendants found guilty by the jury 
of any offense (solid line) or the original offense (long-dashed line), and the share who plead 
guilty without a jury trial (short-dashed line). Panels A, B, and C show all, property and violent 
crime trials, respectively. 
 During the 1700s, the overall conviction rate remains fairly stable: approximately 60% of 
defendants are found guilty by the jury of any charge, with a somewhat larger (smaller) 
conviction rate for property (violent) crimes. The share of defendants guilty of the original 
offense is substantially smaller throughout this period: for violent offenses, it fairly steadily 
fluctuates around 45%, while for property crimes, there is an increasing share of defendants 
convicted of the original offense (from around 20% in the early 1700s to about 50% by 1760). 
 Figure 3 illustrates two important features of the 1800s. First, we see the introduction of 
pleading as a fundamental component of the judicial system. Prior to 1827, in fact, defendants 
were presumed guilty (hence, there was no need to plead guilty). With the introduction of a 
presumption of innocence, the share of defendants pleading guilty increased to about 30% by 
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1850 (almost 40% for property less than 10% for violent crimes). We do not focus on the gap 
in pleading guilty itself (a decision made by the defendant as opposed to the judge or jury). 
Instead, (i) we highlight that our sentencing analyses include all convictions (i.e. both jury 
verdicts and defendant pleas) and (ii) we test the robustness of the gender gap findings to 
including guilty pleas as if they were jury convictions.  
 The second feature of the 19th century is a general increase in jury conviction rates. For 
violent crimes, conviction rates jump from around 50% in the 1830s and 1840s to more than 
60% (and sometimes 70%) for the remainder of the period. A similar but somewhat earlier 
increase is observed for property crimes in the chance of any jury conviction (from around 60% 
to almost 80%), which is driven by an increase in convictions of the original charge. In previous 
work (Bindler and Hjalmarsson, 2018), we demonstrated that these increases in jury conviction 
rates were caused by the offense-specific abolition of capital punishment (the second 
‘experiment’ described above), which occurred earlier for property crimes; we also found 
previously that a jury’s decision to convict females was more responsive to the abolition than 
their decision to convict males. Bindler and Hjalmarsson (2018) thus helps to motivate our 
analyses of whether each sentencing reform studied here differentially affected jury and judge 
treatment of male and female defendants. 
 
4. Tracing Out Raw Gender Gaps during the 18th and 19th Centuries 
The first part of our analysis is descriptive: We document how the raw gender gap in jury 
convictions and judge sentences changed from the start of the 18th to the end of the 19th century.  
 
4.1. Raw Gender Gaps in Convictions 
For all offense categories combined, Figure 4 presents the raw share of females (gray line) and 
males (black line) convicted of any offense (Panel A) or the originally charged offense (Panel 
B). The dashed blue line plots the size of the gender gap in raw conviction rates (males-females) 
relative to the male mean (scaled on the right). See Appendix Figures 1 and 2 for comparable 
figures for property and violent crime, respectively. Figure 4 shows that, despite all of the events 
described above, a sizeable gender gap persists over this 200-year period, with respect to both 
measures of conviction. That is, in every sub-period (up to the last decade which becomes 
somewhat noisier), the share of males convicted of any offense is between 4 and 13 percentage 
points larger than for females. For conviction of the originally charged offense, males and 
female conviction rates both follow the same pattern over time – increasing until the mid-1800s 
and then decreasing again – such that the raw size of the gap ranges from 3 to 17 percentage 
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points up to the last decade of the sample. Relative to the male conviction rate, there is an 
overall decline in the relative size of the gap (for both conviction measures) through the 18th 
century and first half of the 19th century followed by an increase towards the end of the 
century.13  
 The odd-numbered columns of Appendix Table 2 present the raw gender gap (i.e. when 
there are no controls) in approximately 50-year periods: 1715-1750, 1751-1800, 1801-1850, 
and 1851-1900. Panel A shows the results for conviction of any charge (Panels B and C for 
convictions of the original charge and convictions or pleas, respectively). In each of these 
periods, the raw gender gap in the chance of a jury conviction is 11, 6, 6, and 8 percentage 
points, respectively (compared to 8 percentage points overall). Relative to the (male) mean 
conviction rates, these effect sizes translate into 17.2, 10.5, 8.7, and 11.0 percent, respectively. 
 
4.2. Raw Gender Gaps in Sentencing 
Figure 5 presents the share of convicted men and women sentenced to death, 
transportation, prison, and corporal punishment (from left to right), respectively;14 Panel A 
refers to property and Panel B to violent crimes. These figures present some interesting facts 
about the dynamics of the gender gap in sentencing. First, females are less likely to be sentenced 
to death than men while capital punishment existed. This is true for both property and violent 
crimes, although the gender gap appears larger for violent crimes, for which the death penalty 
was more salient. The capital punishment gender gap fluctuates around 5 percentage points for 
property crimes and 18 percentage points for violent crimes (up to 1840). Second, for property 
crimes, a gender gap in transportation sentences favoring females emerges in the 1740s; this 
spikes during the Revolution and remains somewhat larger after the emergence of the 
Australian penal colony. In contrast, for violent crimes, the gender gap is reversed; women are 
more likely to be sentenced to transportation than men through the 1700s and first decades of 
the 1800s. This suggests that females charged with violent crimes are ‘favored’ by being 
                                                 
13Appendix Figures 3 and 4 dig further into this pattern. Appendix Figure 3 shows the number of cases by gender 
and the share of female defendants for eight offenses (each with male and female defendants in each decade) 
covering a wide range of crime types: larceny (the most common offense), pickpocketing, receiving, theft from 
place, burglary, fraud, murder, and robbery. The share of female defendants declines steeply for each property 
crime offense, but is flatter (or even increasing) for the violent crimes of robbery and murder. Yet, even when 
zooming in on a specific offense (e.g. larceny) with an unambiguous decline in female representation, we see a 
persistently flat gap in conviction rates, as shown in Appendix Figure 4.  
14Earlier versions of this paper show the gender gap in receiving the harshest punishment available for a given 
offense at the time. Looking at the gap in this way, one observes a very persistent gap – females were consistently 
less likely to be sentenced to the harshest available punishment (available upon request). But, such an aggregation 
hides variation across punishment categories – variation that is informative about the underlying mechanism.  
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transported rather than sentenced to death; consistent with this, the transportation gender gap 
for violent crimes disappears around the abolition of capital punishment.   
Third, we turn to prison. For violent crime, little to no gender gap is seen throughout the 
sample period, regardless of the prevalence of prison. For property crime, however, we see that 
females are more likely to be sentenced to imprisonment immediately after its emergence as a 
sanction, i.e. after the end of the American Revolution and introduction of the transportation to 
Australia sentence. This pattern persists until the abolition of transportation in the 1850s at 
which point the gender gap in imprisonment for property crimes actually reveres; females are 
10 (or more) percentage points more likely to be sentenced to prison before the abolition of 
transportation but about 5 percentage points less likely to be sentenced to prison afterwards. 
We note, however, that although the gender gap switches sign, the post 1850 gap is small 
relative to the mean incarceration rate, which reached more than 80% by this time.  
Finally, corporal punishment was primarily used as a sanction for property crimes. Again, 
we see a reversal in sign of the gender gap over the sample period: Prior to the Revolution, 
when it was the least harsh punishment available, females were about 10 percentage points 
more likely to be sentenced to corporal punishment than males. With the post-Revolution 
emergence of prisons, females were less likely than men to receive corporal punishment. 
The odd numbered columns of Appendix Table 2 summarize the persistence of the raw 
gender gap in sentencing, more generally, in the same four time periods (1715-1750, 1751-
1800, 1801-1850, and 1851-1900). In contrast to Figure 5, we define the dependent variable as 
being sentenced to the harshest punishment available (for a specific offense and time period). 
This avoids the problem of essentially meaningless specifications where the outcome is a 
sanction that is not possible in these 50-year time intervals. That is, the results can be understood 
as a summary of the above observations: The raw gender gap in the chance of being sentenced 
to the harshest punishment available is 10, 14, 10 and 6 percentage points, respectively 
(compared to 14 percentage points overall). Relative to the (male) mean sentencing rates, these 
effect sizes imply that females are 18, 25, 25, and 7 percent, respectively, less likely to be 
sentenced to the harshest available punishment in each of the above periods. Note that both the 
relative and absolute gap in the sentencing rate to the harshest punishment available is smallest 
for the last 50-year interval. For most of the latter half of the 19th century, prison is the harshest 
punishment available for most offenses. That is, by this time, a number of sentencing reforms 
substantially decreased punishment severity. 
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The descriptive analysis above clearly suggests that sanction severity affects the sentencing 
gender gap. Our ‘experimental’ analysis returns to many of the patterns observed in this section 
to more formally assess the extent to which the gender gap is affected by changing sanctions.  
 
5. Case Characteristics and Persistent Gender Gaps 
5.1. Regression Adjusted Results: Controlling for Observables 
Are the raw gender gaps simply an artefact of a differential distribution of offenses and case 
characteristics (with different conviction rates or potential punishments) by defendant gender? 
Do the changing gender gaps, especially in sentencing, reflect a changing composition of 
offenses at the courts? We formally address these explanations by estimating the gender gap in 
verdict and sentencing outcomes net of observable case characteristics:  
 
(1) 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖δ + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
The baseline set of observables (X) includes the number of defendants, 23 detailed offense type 
dummies, whether the offense is capital at that time, and year fixed effects.15 The latter capture 
unobservable characteristics of, for instance, the justice system common to male and female 
defendants; our results, however, are robust to excluding the year dummies.16   
 
Convictions: Regression Adjusted Results 
We begin by estimating equation (1) for each conviction outcome by decade (these decade 
specific regressions omit year fixed effects). Figure 4 (C and D) presents the regression adjusted 
gender gap coefficient (black, solid line) and 95% confidence interval (shaded area) for jury 
convictions of any and the original offense. For ease of comparison, the raw gap (blue, open 
circles, dashed line) is also shown. For both conviction outcomes, the raw and adjusted gaps 
are almost identical throughout the sample period; if anything, the latter is slightly larger.17 The 
even-numbered columns of Appendix Table 2 confirm this conclusion: the gender gaps in 
convictions are not explained by observable differences in case characteristics in any of the 50-
year time intervals. 
                                                 
15 We highlight here that there is substantial variation in the capital status of offenses. Specifically, it varies across 
offenses (most, though not all, were capital at some time) and over time. But, capital punishment is not abolished 
for all offenses at the same time; so this variation is not wiped out by year fixed effects. 
16 While the most obvious differences in case characteristics, such as females committing more minor offenses, 
point towards on over-estimate of the gender gap, it is clearly possible for omitted variables to bias the gender gap 
in the other direction. We come back to the importance of potential omitted variables in our discussion of Table 3. 
17 Our baseline specification is based on a linear probability model, avoiding biases associated with fixed effects 
in non-linear binary choice models. However, our results are robust to changing our distributional assumptions 
and estimating a probit instead. Results available on request. 
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Table 2 provides further evidence that it is not just observable differences in case 
characteristics that explain the underlying gender gap. Specifically, we estimate the (adjusted) 
gender gap separately by offense, and rank the estimates according to the share of female 
defendants. Focusing on the main property offenses, we see a fair bit of variation in the gender 
compositions: shoplifting (46%), receiving (29%), pickpocketing (27%), larceny (26%), 
stealing from master (23%), housebreaking (13%), robbery (13%), and burglary (7%). 
Significant gender gaps are seen for almost all offense categories; the corresponding gaps to 
the above offenses are -0.04, -0.10, -0.19, -0.07, +0.03, -0.15, -0.07, and -0.21. These results 
speak to the fact that observable offense characteristics (including the share of female 
defendants) do not explain the gender gap.  
 
Sentencing: Regression Adjusted Results 
Figure 6 shows the corresponding graphs for each sentencing category for both property 
and violent crimes; Appendix Figure 5 shows the results for all offenses. A similar pattern is 
seen for the sentencing outcomes as the conviction outcomes; the regression adjusted and raw 
gaps track each other very closely over time. The only exception is capital punishment for 
property crimes (Panel A); controlling for offense dummies matters here since there is 
substantial variation in capital classification. As before, Appendix Table 2 confirms these 
observations for our summary measure of the harshest punishment available. 
 
5.2. Regression Adjusted Results: Controlling for a Proxy for Unobservables 
Though observable differences in case characteristics do little to explain the conviction 
and sentencing gender gaps, this does not completely rule out that there are unobservable (to 
the researcher) differences in case characteristics by gender, such as the severity of a crime 
within a category or the quality of evidence. We can assess the extent to which unobservable 
differences are a likely explanation of the gaps by studying subsamples of data for which we 
can observe additional information.   
Table 3 presents the adjusted gender gap corresponding to equation (1) for all offenses 
and various subsamples of the data with additional information available. Each panel 
corresponds to different conviction and sentencing outcomes. Column (1) presents the raw gap 
for the full sample period (1715-1900) and column (2) controls for the baseline set of controls 
(including year fixed effects). Naturally, looking at all offense categories across the entire 
sample period hides heterogeneity in sentencing gaps for violent and property crimes (which 
are subject to different sentences) and over time (as sentencing policy changed). Rather than 
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addressing these points (to which we return in our ‘experimental’ analyses in Section 5), the 
aim of this exercise is to assess the extent to which the additional controls matter (or rather do 
not matter) – i.e. is there selection on these ‘unobservables’? Consistent with the decade specific 
figures, columns (1) and (2) demonstrate that adding our baseline set of controls has little impact 
on the overall average gap. Columns (3) and (4) demonstrate that controlling for criminal 
history (only available after 1832) does not have a substantive effect on the gender gap.18   
To further empirically test the importance of unobserved differences, we use the number of 
words per trial in the Proceedings as a proxy for unobserved characteristics for every trial in 
the February, May and September sessions from 1751 to 1810.19 We argue that juries may have 
additional information (e.g. on the number of victims, testimony length, or sensationalism) that 
is not observed by us, but - given that testimony is often published verbatim - likely to be 
captured by word count. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 show, however, that word count has 
little to no effect on the gender gap. These results suggest that it is unlikely that unobservable 
case differences explain a substantial portion of the gender gap, and is, in fact, consistent with 
minimal evidence actually being presented at trial. Feeley (1997) describes trials that were, on 
average, eight minutes long in the early 1800s and more consistent with the modern-day 
sentencing phase of a trial. While these analyses find no evidence that observables and proxies 
for unobservables explain any of the estimated gender gaps, we can of course not rule out the 
possibility that biases due to omitted variables still exist.  
 
5.3. Within Judge and Jury Gender Gaps 
One possible unobservable is a systematic assignment of females to judges and juries who 
are more ‘lenient’ in their treatment of all defendants. Indeed, one can observe substantial 
variation across juries in the share of defendants convicted (figures available upon request). To 
empirically test whether this plays a role, we estimate within-jury gender gaps in convictions 
and within-judge gender gaps in sentencing decisions for 1751 to 1822, when jury and judge 
information is available in the data. Yet, as seen in columns (7) and (8) of Table 3, including 
judge and jury fixed effects does not explain the estimated gender gaps. 
 
                                                 
18 Columns (9) and (10) of Table 3 demonstrate the robustness of the results to controlling for defendant age, which 
is only consistently available for convicted defendants after 1800. 
19 Word count is collected for these particular years, as these years have jury identifiers. Bindler and Hjalmarsson 
(forthcoming) use the word count as a measure of unobservables to study path dependency in jury decision making. 
Regressions (shown in Appendix Table 3 of Bindler and Hjalmarsson, forthcoming) show that word count is 
related to observables, with generally more words for the most severe offenses, capital cases, and multiple 
defendants. Yet, much of the variation in word count is unexplained by observables. 
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5.4. The Female as Wife and/or Mother 
The girlfriend theory, discussed in a modern day context by Starr (2015), suggests that a 
female is deemed not capable of being responsible of a crime; this was a formal part of the 
historical legal system for married couples (feme covert). Testing this explicitly in the Old 
Bailey data, we find that though the gap is generally larger for same name (likely married) than 
different name pairs of male and female co-defendants, this represents a small share of cases. 
As a gender gap exists also for single defendant cases, the girl-friend theory clearly cannot be 
the main explanation for our findings. The results are reported in Appendix Table 3.  
We also argue that the importance of females as mothers is not the driving factor of the 
gender gaps. Using the Old Bailey Corpus Online, we find 2,154 utterances of the word 
‘children’ (in just over 1000 trials); 39% of the utterances are by female defendants. Given that 
there are almost 200,000 cases, this low hit rate is by itself suggestive that the existence of 
children did not play a substantial role in case outcomes.20 Moreover, the word ‘child’ was 
often used at the time in an alternative context – to be as innocent as the child unborn (many 
reports indeed read as if they were a plea for mercy in sentencing). One caveat of that approach 
is that our (best available) measure of having children is an imperfect one. 
 
6. Taste-based Discrimination: Evidence from Changing Sanction Regimes 
Thus far, we have demonstrated a persistent and significant gender gap in convictions and 
sentencing, which cannot be explained by observable and unobservable differences in case 
characteristics. While one can never completely rule out the possibility that there are still 
unobservables, this seems unlikely given the lack of sensitivity of the results to observable 
controls. That is, ‘selection’ on unobservables would have to be many times greater than that 
on observables.  
 This leaves discrimination as a remaining explanation of the gender gap. Such 
discrimination could, in theory, take two forms: preference or taste-based discrimination and 
statistical discrimination. Taste-based discrimination would imply that the all-male judiciary is 
less likely to convict female defendants and more likely to give them relatively lenient sentences 
out of a desire to protect them; such discrimination could be characterized as paternalism. 
Statistical discrimination, on the other hand, would occur if juries and judges, respectively, 
were less likely to convict or sentence females because of a general belief that females are less 
                                                 
20 The search was conducted October 3, 2017 on http://www1.uni-giessen.de/oldbaileycorpus/search.html; we 
searched for the word ‘children’ with no constraints on speaker role or year. We note that we do not do a similar 
word-search for mother or feme-covert since the Old Bailey Proceedings generally do not include statements and 
discussions by judges or juries. 
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likely to commit crimes or to commit less serious crimes; in the face of perhaps imperfect 
information about a crime, judges and juries could use a defendant’s gender as a source of 
additional information.  
It is certainly feasible that taste-based discrimination, in the form of paternalism, explains 
the persistence of the gender gaps over time. In particular, this pattern lines up with what we 
know about societal attitudes during the 200-year period: females were persistently viewed as 
the ‘weaker sex’. Well-known (male and female) 18th and 19th century authors make clear that 
females are perceived and raised to be ‘inferior’ to men. For instance, Reverend James Fordyce 
instructs women to be submissive, meek, and sensitive in his 1766 Sermons to Young Women, 
while Mary Wollstonecraft (1792) describes women as “in a state of perpetual childhood, 
unable to stand alone”. Even in the mid-1800s, Sara Stickney Ellis (circa 1845) writes that “as 
women, then, the first thing of importance is to be content to be inferior to men” while John 
Ruskin (1865) highlights the role of men as the protector of women: “The man, in his rough 
work in open world, must encounter all peril and trial….But he guards the woman from all 
this….”. Thus, given that males were deemed responsible for the welfare of females (their 
wives) in the home, it seems feasible that they carried this duty over to the courtroom.21  
While this suggests that our results might plausibly be driven by taste-based 
discrimination, the fact that large and significant gender gaps are seen for both verdicts and 
sentencing is in contrast suggestive of a limited role for statistical discrimination. At the 
sentencing stage, the defendant has already been found guilty and, thus, there is no (at least, 
less) uncertainty left for which a signal given by gender may be useful.22 
Though the above points towards taste-based discrimination playing a relatively more 
important role, it is of course empirically difficult to distinguish between both types of 
discrimination. This section takes advantage of the dynamic changes in punishment regimes to 
focus on taste-based discrimination; if large changes in punishment severity differentially affect 
male and female conviction and/or sentencing outcomes, this is strongly suggestive of 
preference-based discrimination in which the all-male judiciary protects the ‘weaker’ sex. 
Moreover, this would be consistent with the main takeaways from the analysis thus far – namely 
that females are more (less) likely than males to be sentenced to a punishment for which there 
are harsher (more lenient) substitutes and that the sign of the gap changes with reforms that 
                                                 
21 The role of men as the breadwinner (Horrell and Humphries, 1995) is empirically seen in analyses (available on 
request) of Census data from 1851 to 1911, which show a gap in labor market participation for men and women 
over age 18: in 1851, 47% of females versus 95% of males ages 18-34 participated in the labor market. 
22 A potential exception is if the judge feels the need to correct the jurors’ behavior. Any such correction would 
likely run in the opposite direction of what we find and instead lead to harsher, but not more lenient sentencing. 
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change the relative severity of a given punishment. While we provide evidence that paternalism 
plays an important role in explaining the persistent gender gap in the criminal justice system, 
we cannot empirically rule out a parallel statistical discrimination story.  
 
6.1. The American Revolution, the Rise of Prisons and Transportation to Australia 
The first change in punishment regimes occurred with the unexpected loss of the American 
penal colonies during the American Revolution in 1776. We consider how the gender gaps 
changed during two post periods: (i) From 1776 to 1786, transportation was halted and prisons 
and prison hulks (for men only) were introduced. (ii) From 1787 to 1795, transportation to 
Australia now existed, as well as the continued and expanding use of prisons (which were 
harsher and more lenient, respectively, than pre-Revolution transportation).23 To assess if and 
how these changes affected the gender gap, we estimate equation (2) for the years 1765 to 1795.  
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. As in our earlier adjusted gender gap regressions, 
X includes a vector of offense dummies and the number of defendants, but it does not include 
capital eligibility, which did not change during this period. We consider three conviction 
outcomes (convicted of any offense, the original charge, and a lesser charge) and the four 
sentencing outcomes (death, transportation, prison, and corporal punishment). 
 
(2) 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂1𝑖𝑖76−86 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂2𝑖𝑖87−95 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂1𝑖𝑖76−86 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂2𝑖𝑖87−95 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖δ + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
This regression provides three pieces of information: 𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2 inform us on whether juries and 
judges respond to the changes in expected punishment following this shift. The judge 
sentencing effect is, of course, partly mechanical as the availability of transportation changes; 
including transportation as a sentencing outcome, however, provides empirical documentation 
that the ‘reforms’ were implemented as we described. 𝛽𝛽3 informs us about the gender gaps in 
convictions and sentencing that exist prior to the shift in sanctions, while 𝛽𝛽4 and 𝛽𝛽5 indicate 
whether these gaps significantly changed with the introduction of the new sentence regimes. 
Our main interest lies in the interaction terms.  
 A distinguishing feature of this ‘experiment’ is that the change in punishment is driven 
by a war in a foreign country. Thus, though the shock is exogenous to the criminal justice 
system, other things may change concurrently with the war. This implies that we can only 
capture the reduced form effect of the Revolution. Unfortunately, we do not have a large enough 
sample of non-transportation eligible offenses to estimate a difference-in-differences model to 
                                                 
23 Transportation (in name only) was re-introduced in 1781, as there was no sustainable penal colony yet. 
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control for potential other changes during the war.24 We note, however, this limitation may be 
less relevant for the post-war period (as opposed to during the war). We also highlight here that 
we have previously studied this natural experiment (Bindler and Hjalmarsson, 2018) to learn 
about the effect of expected punishment on jury verdicts, finding that the temporary halt of 
transportation reduced the chance of conviction for non-capital offenses. Here, we expand our 
previous analyses to consider alternative measures of conviction and sentencing outcomes, and, 
importantly, whether there are differential effects by gender.  
 
The Shift in Punishment Regimes and Gender Gaps in Convictions 
 Table 4 presents the jury conviction and judge sentencing results in columns (1)–(3) and 
(4)–(7), respectively; Panels A, B, and C present results for all, property, and violent offenses, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered by offense.25 There are a number of interesting and 
relevant findings. First, consistent with the gender gaps in conviction shown earlier, females 
are less likely to be convicted of any charge (9 percentage points) and the original charge (12 
percentage points) but more likely to be convicted of a lesser charge (4 percentage points). This 
is largely driven by property crime, but similar effects are seen for violent crime.  Are females 
differentially affected by the reforms? Yes, with the evolution of prison as a sentencing option, 
i.e. in the second post period, females are differentially more likely to be convicted of the 
original charge (about +6 percentage points) rather than a lesser charge (-4 percentage points). 
This is also seen for both property and violent crimes.  
Thus, the gender gap in convictions gets smaller as the minimum expected punishment 
decreases from pre-Revolution transportation to prison. Though the gap decreases, however, 
we note that it is not completely eliminated: females are 12 percentage points less likely to be 
convicted of the original charge pre-Revolution but 6 percentage points less likely after. 
Moreover, the gap in convictions of any charge does not change. Finally, an important caveat 
is that we just study a short period after the shock, and do not test the persistence of this effect 
– this is hard to do given all of the other dynamic historical changes.  
                                                 
24 Of course, the inability to implement a differences-in-differences design may raise questions about the causal 
interpretation of these pre-post analyses. The robustness of the results, however, to controlling for a linear trend 
(in the spirt of a regression discontinuity design) provides support for such an interpretation. In particular, 
Appendix Table 7 shows that the main coefficients of interest (for female plus the interaction terms) are robust to 
(i) not including year fixed effects nor any trend, (ii) including a linear trend instead of year fixed effects and (iii) 
including offense-specific linear trends.  
25 The overall samples includes 22 offenses, which is clearly a borderline (but generally) acceptable number of 
clusters. Clustering by offense for the property (8 offenses) and violent (5 offenses) crime samples is potentially 
more problematic. However, Appendix Tables 4-6 show the robustness of our results to alternatively using robust 
standard errors. If anything, using the clustered standard errors as the baseline is the more conservative choice. 
20 
 
 
The Shift in Punishment Regimes and Gender Gaps in Sentencing 
In terms of sentencing, we see a clear decrease in transportation during the temporary halt 
that persists into the post period; that is, consistent with historical descriptions, transportation 
becomes unavailable during the war. During the temporary halt, transportation eligible offenses 
are shifted into prison/prison hulks and corporal punishment (approximately equally). During 
the second post-period, a significant increase in sentences to prison, corporal punishment, and 
miscellaneous or no punishment is observed (the latter two categories are not shown). Most 
importantly for any conclusion regarding taste-based discrimination, females are 
disproportionately more likely (14 percentage points) to be sentenced to prison during both the 
temporary halt and the second post period. Of course, one might question whether this 
represents preferences or simply capacity constraints (i.e. there may have been fewer positions 
for females in Australia and females are excluded from the hulks). However, seeing a similarly 
disproportionate shift for females away from corporal punishment (which is not capacity 
constrained) speaks towards preference-based discrimination being the dominant channel. In 
particular, column (7) shows that females were 5 percentage points more likely to be sentenced 
to corporal punishment before the Revolution, but 8 percentage points (0.05–0.13) less likely 
after the introduction of (harsh) transportation to Australia.26  
In summary, we find empirical evidence that both judge and jury decisions are differentially 
affected by the changes in relative punishment severity after the American Revolution, 
suggesting that they are ‘protecting’ female defendants from the harsher punishment regimes. 
 
6.2. The Abolition of Capital Punishment 
The next shift in punishment severity came with the offense-specific abolition of capital 
punishment between 1807 (pickpocketing) and 1856 (arson). In Bindler and Hjalmarsson 
(2018), using a slightly different sample, we found that abolishing the death penalty increased 
the chance of any conviction by more than 7 percentage points (driven by violent and sex 
offenses) and the chance of conviction of the original charge by 16 percentage points (driven 
by property offenses). To avoid the death penalty, jurors had to acquit (or convict but 
recommend mercy) for violent offenses, but could more easily convict of lesser (non-capital) 
charges for property offenses. Moreover, we found that the abolition differentially affected the 
conviction of male and female defendants charged with violent offenses.  
                                                 
26 This is consistent with earlier descriptions of Figure 6 and confirms that the change is in fact significant.  
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We use the same difference-in-differences approach and sample years (1803-1871) to 
replicate and expand the Bindler and Hjalmarsson (2018) analysis for the sample of non-gender 
specific offenses in this paper and a wider range of outcomes, including conviction of lesser 
offenses and judge sentences. See columns (6) and (7) of Table 1 for summary statistics. 
 As in Bindler and Hjalmarsson (2018), we identify the year of abolition for each offense 
and classify offenses as never, always or once capital eligible.27 Intuitively, the always and 
never capital offenses serve as ‘control’ offenses while those for which the death penalty was 
abolished are ‘treated’ (with a staggered treatment). We compare the change in conviction and 
sentencing rates in the years surrounding reforms for defendants charged with treated offenses 
to the change for control offenses, thereby controlling for other changes in society that affect 
both treated and control offenses. We use this framework to assess whether these reforms 
differentially affect male and female defendants, and the corresponding gender gaps.  
 Panels A-C, respectively, of Figure 7 illustrate the intuition of the difference-in-
differences model by plotting the annual share of death, transportation, and prison sentences 
separately for the treatment group (black) and control group (gray) as well as for females (solid 
lines) and males (dashed lines). Since treatment occurs in multiple years, we center the figure 
on the crime-specific year of reform for the treatment offenses (see the vertical line); for the 
control offenses, we use a weighted average of years corresponding to the share of reforms 
occurring in a given year. Panel A shows that males charged with treated offenses were 
sentenced to death at a higher rate than females prior to abolition (40% versus 25%) and that 
the share of death sentences for both males and females drops sharply to zero at the time of the 
reform; this mechanical elimination of the gender gap also provides clear evidence that the 
death penalty abolition was implemented, as required by the law. Panel B shows that the use of 
transportation for both treated and control offenses is increasing somewhat in the years before 
the abolition and then starts to decline around the time of capital abolition (as prisons expand). 
Yet, for treated offenses, there is a sharp increase in transportation sentences around the 
abolition for both females and males. How does the gender gap change around the reform? It 
appears that the increase in transportation for males in the treatment group exceeds the increase 
for females in the treatment group; we test this more formally in our regression analysis. Finally, 
Panel C illustrates that prison levels for control offenses were generally higher than treated 
offenses (before and after the reform and for males and females). The abolition sharply 
increased the share of male and female offenders sentenced to incarceration; we rely again on 
                                                 
27 See Appendix Table 2 in Bindler and Hjalmarsson (2018). 
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the formal regressions to assess whether this affected the size of the gender gap in incarceration.  
 Equation (3) presents the formal difference-in-differences model for each conviction and 
sentencing outcome Y for defendant i charged with offense o in year t. 
 
(3) 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
Noncapital is an indicator equal to one for offense-year combinations for which the offense is 
not capital eligible. As offense fixed effects are a fundamental part of the identification (it is 
the offense that determines treatment status), we explicitly separate them out from X (the 
number of defendants). Year fixed effects (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) capture other potential shocks and reforms that 
affect all offenses. 𝛽𝛽1, 𝛽𝛽2, and 𝛽𝛽3 inform us, respectively, on how the abolition of capital 
punishment affected judicial behavior overall, whether there was a gender gap in the pre-period, 
and whether this gap changed with the abolition of capital punishment.28,29  
To assign a causal interpretation to these coefficients requires a number of identifying 
assumptions. The first is the usual parallel trends assumption, i.e. that the changes in conviction 
rates and sentencing outcomes for treatment offenses would have been the same as for control 
offenses in the absence of the reforms. Parallel pre-trends in Figure 7 already suggest this is 
plausible. Other assumptions are that the timing of the offense-specific abolition was random 
and that the composition of cases and associated evidence did not change after the reforms. 
Bindler and Hjalmarsson (2018) provides extensive empirical support of these assumptions: (i) 
results are robust to offense-specific time trends, (ii) there are no significant ‘leads’ in event-
study specifications, (iii) there is no significant change in the chance of pleading guilty nor in 
observable criminal behavior, and (iv) the quality of evidence, measured using keyword 
searches for police, evidence and witness, does not significantly increase. We refer the reader 
to this previous paper for the respective results, and further discussions of the identifying 
assumptions. 
 
The Abolition of Capital Punishment and Gender Gaps in Convictions 
 Table 5 presents the main results. We begin with the conviction outcomes in columns (1)-
(3). Consistent with our earlier work, the abolition of capital punishment increases the chance 
                                                 
28 Standard errors are again clustered by offense. Bindler and Hjalmarsson (2018) shows that the conclusions are 
unchanged when alternatively using one-way and two-way clustering, block bootstrap as well as wild t-bootstrap. 
Appendix Tables 4-6 show our results with robust instead of clustered standard errors. 
29 As shown in Bindler and Hjalmarsson (2018), the capital punishment analyses are robust to excluding never 
capital and always capital offenses, respectively. 
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of any conviction by 19 percentage points for violent crimes and increases (decreases) the 
chance of conviction of the original charge (a lesser charge) by 16 (15) percentage points for 
property crimes. More importantly, how are the pre-existing gender gaps affected? For violent 
offenses, the 12 percentage point gap in the chance of conviction is almost completely offset 
by the abolition of capital punishment. Similarly, for property crimes, the gender gap in 
conviction of a lesser charge (about 5 percentages points) is offset by the reform, but there is 
no significant change in the gender gap for the chance of being convicted of the original or any 
charge. Again, the lack of an overall effect on conviction squares with the persistence of the 
conviction gender gap throughout the sample, which is dominated by property offenses. 
 
The Abolition of Capital Punishment and Gender Gaps in Sentencing 
 In terms of sentencing, the abolition of capital punishment completely eliminates the 
previously existing gender gap in death sentences (column (4)); again, this mechanical effect 
simply shows that the abolition of the death penalty was implemented in practice as prescribed 
by the law. The more interesting question is whether a gender gap arises in other (substitute) 
sentences. The interaction coefficients for transportation, prison, and corporal punishments in 
columns (5)-(7) are negative, but generally insignificant. The only statistically significant 
estimate (10% level) is found for transportation for violent crimes. Thus, while we see some 
response of juries to abolishing capital punishment that depend on defendant gender, we do not 
find much evidence that judges differentially respond to the new sanctions. It may be that we 
simply cannot observe changes in judge behavior, as there is no flexibility/nuance in sentencing 
at the extensive margin. However, as we cannot observe the ‘intensive’ margin, we cannot rule 
out that abolishing capital punishment increases the gender gap in prison sentence lengths or 
the likelihood of getting a pardon. 
In summary, we find statistical evidence that the decrease in punishment severity due to the 
death penalty abolition differentially affected males and females: jurors and judges 
disproportionately protected female defendants before the abolition.  
   
6.3. The Abolition of Transportation 
The abolition of capital punishment was eventually followed by the abolition of transportation. 
Since, as described above, the 1853 Act ended transportation for most offenses while the 1857 
Act had little additional bite, we focus on the former. Did the 1853 abolition of transportation 
differentially effect male and female conviction rates and sentences? As with the temporary halt 
and introduction of transportation to Australia (Section 6.1), we are limited to a pre-post 
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specification (with a differential treatment effect for males and females) due to a lack of a 
suitable control group. We focus on the sample years 1845 to 1860 and estimate equation (4): 
 
(4) 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖1853 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖1853 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖δ + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
As before, Y denotes the respective outcome (verdict, sentence) for defendant i charged with 
offense o in year t. Post1853 is a dummy equal to one in 1853 and later and X is a vector of 
observable controls (number of defendants, capital eligibility and offense dummies). Year fixed 
effects (𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖) capture shocks affecting all offenses. 𝛽𝛽1, 𝛽𝛽2, and 𝛽𝛽3 inform us, respectively, on how 
the 1853 abolition of transportation affected the respective outcome overall, whether there was 
a gender gap in the pre-period, and whether this gap changed with the reform.  
The abolition of transportation falls into a dynamic period of reforms, which poses some 
caveats to our analysis. First, the 1853 reform follows a period of reforms abolishing capital 
punishment offense by offense (arson was not until 1856), and it is possible that the (persistent) 
effects last into our sample period. Second, just before the 1853 abolition of transportation, we 
see a change in the composition of offenses, as cases are shifted out of the Old Bailey and into 
lower courts. Finally, the abolition of transportation is the last of a series of reforms lowering 
the severity of punishments; at the same time, while the 1853 reform constitutes the de jure 
abolition of transportation, de facto there was already a large decrease in transportation 
sentences (for property offenses) leading up to the reform (see Section 3.2). Given these 
potential confounders, our main aim is to assess whether there was a differential impact of the 
transportation abolition on male and female defendants and not its overall impact per se.30 
  
The Abolition of Transportation and Gender Gaps in Convictions 
The results are shown in Table 6. In terms of conviction, the abolition only had a 
significant impact for violent offenses: it increased (decreased) the chance of conviction of the 
original (lesser) charge.  More to the point, however, there is no differential impact by gender 
for either property or violent offenses: the point estimate on the interaction term is never 
significantly different from zero and is in fact close to zero in most cases.  
 
The Abolition of Transportation and Gender Gaps in Sentencing 
                                                 
30 Moreover, the main results are again – as in the case of the temporary halt of transportation – robust to controlling 
for linear time trends (i.e. in the spirit of a regression discontinuity design around the reform). See Appendix Table 
8 for the results when we (i) do not include year fixed effects nor a trend, (ii) include a linear trend instead of year 
fixed effects and (iii) include offense-specific linear trends. As before, the main coefficients of interest (for female 
and for the interaction terms) prove to be robust to the different specification choices. 
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Turning to the sentencing outcomes in columns (4) to (7), we first note that (reassuringly) 
there is no impact on death sentences; this suggests that our empirical specification is capable 
of disentangling the effect of the abolition of transportation from the abolition of capital 
punishment, which was nearing its end in our sample period. The decrease in transportation in 
column (5) for both property and violent crimes confirms that transportation was abolished in 
practice. Further, females were less likely to be sentenced to transportation before 1853; this 
gap is mechanically eliminated upon the abolition of transportation. As seen in Section 3, the 
change in the sentencing regime led to an increase in prison sentences; column (6) of Table 6 
indicates that there was a 25 percentage point increase in the chance of prison after 1853. Most 
interestingly, females were about five percentage points more likely to be sentenced to prison 
before 1853, but three percentage points less likely after 1853 (0.0473-0.0782). That is, the 
abolition of transportation differentially affected the sentencing of females to prison in a manner 
consistent with our earlier findings – namely that a female favoring gap is introduced in a 
sanction when that sanction is the harshest punishment available, i.e. as the relative severity of 
prison as a punishment increased. These results are not seen for violent crimes, for which there 
is a relatively low share of offenses; however, such gender gaps could have been introduced in 
sentencing margins, e.g. sentence length, which we cannot observe.  
   
6.4. Further Evidence of Discrimination: Differential Quality of Evidence 
The results from the analyses of sentencing regime shifts suggest that taste-based discrimination 
(or paternalism) plays an important role in explaining the observed gender gaps. Such forms of 
discrimination would imply that juries are willing to acquit females with a relatively high degree 
of evidence against them, as any disutility due to the potential release of a criminal is offset by 
their positive taste for protecting females. In other words, preference-based discrimination 
should raise the quality of evidence threshold needed to convict a female relative to a male. We 
note that a similar implication could be found, however, in a statistical discrimination scenario 
– i.e. where juries require a higher level of evidence to believe that a particular female is guilty, 
given potential beliefs about females being less criminal on average. 
 Measuring quality of evidence – in even a modern-day context – is notoriously difficult. 
We consider one potential input into a measure of quality of evidence; we manually coded the 
number of prosecution witnesses in each February, May and September session from 1800 to 
1810 (almost 3500 cases). Given that we do not (and cannot) evaluate the character of or quality 
of each witness, this is clearly an imperfect measure. Yet, we believe it to be a valid component: 
the more witnesses brought by the prosecution, the stronger the case. In fact, almost all cases 
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(99.7%) with no prosecution witnesses are acquitted. Do prosecutors get a lower return on 
witness testimony for female versus male defendants?   
Table 7 presents the regression adjusted gender gap for this sample using the baseline 
specification in column (1), with controls for prosecution witness in columns (2) and (3), and 
interactions with the number of witnesses and defendant gender in columns (4) and (5). Similar 
to our main sample, females are almost nine percentage points less likely to be convicted and 
this is not affected by controlling for the number of witnesses. But, male defendants with one 
witness against them are convicted, on average, 63% of the time while females with one witness 
are convicted just 50% (0.63-0.13) of the time. When there are two or more witnesses, males 
are convicted 74% of the time versus 67% for females. In other words, prosecutors actually 
need (at least) two witnesses for female defendants to achieve approximately the same 
conviction rate as that for male defendants with one witness. This average lower return to 
prosecutorial witness testimony for female versus male defendants can reflect the preferences 
or beliefs (‘discrimination’) of the jury, who hold the witnesses to a higher standard, or even 
the preferences of the witnesses themselves, who may behave differently depending on the 
defendant’s gender. Thus, these results provide further evidence consistent with a story of 
discrimination, though they are not conclusive about whether it is taste-based or statistical 
discrimination. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper finds a criminal justice gender gap in convictions and sentencing that (i) favors 
females, (ii) persists through almost 200 years, (iii) is seen across offense categories, and (iv) 
is not explained by observable and proxies for unobservable case characteristics. Though we 
cannot empirically rule out that statistical discrimination plays a role, we do provide empirical 
evidence consistent with a taste-based discrimination mechanism. Consistent with paternalism, 
there is a differential response of the all-male jury in convicting and the all-male judiciary in 
sentencing male and female defendants when faced with changing punishment regimes. That 
is, a role that was played by men in society at this time appears to spill over into the courtroom.31   
Specifically, gender gaps in jury convictions tend to get smaller when punishment 
severity decreases. However, though these local changes in jury behavior inform us on the 
importance of taste-based discrimination as an underlying mechanism, they are generally not 
                                                 
31 A natural follow-up question is how the gap was affected when female representation was introduced to the 
judiciary. Anwar et al. (2019) find that the addition of females to the Old Bailey jury pool in 1921 impacted 
conviction rates for more ‘female salient’ cases, including sex offenses, male versus female victim cases, and 
female defendants charged with other (including abortion) offenses. 
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large enough to eliminate these persistent gender gaps in conviction. Judges persistently react 
to these reforms by imposing a sentencing gap on whichever sentence becomes (in relative 
terms) the harshest punishment available after a sentencing reform.  
This conclusion of a taste-based discrimination mechanism is in line with the modern-
day findings of Schanzenbach (2005) and Philippe (forthcoming) that the presence of female 
judges decreases the gender gap, which they interpret as evidence of a paternalistic bias of male 
judges. However, they contrast the conclusions of Butcher et al. (2017), based on a rank order 
test, that tastes for gender discrimination are unlikely to drive the gender gap in sentencing. 
Are the decisions, and underlying attitudes towards females, of judges and jurors of this 
historical period informative (externally valid) to that of their contemporary counterparts? 
During our 200-year sample, there is a persistent, explicit bias towards women as the weaker 
sex. This bias is seen in the courtroom (to the benefit of women). While today’s writings do not 
exhibit the same explicit bias as in the 18th and 19th centuries, these beliefs may still be prevalent 
and carried over to the courtroom as an implicit bias. As gender gaps are certainly still seen in 
contemporary criminal justice outcomes, (male and female) agents of the justice system today 
may be unconsciously and unintentionally discriminating (Bertrand et al., 2005) on the basis of 
gender. Despite all of the ground gained by women, this perception may not have completely 
disappeared – even if it is less spoken. 
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Figure 1. Number of Cases by Broad Offense Category and Gender 
A. Total number of cases B. Number of cases by gender 
  
C. Property offense by gender D. Violent offenses by gender 
  
NOTE – Figure A shows the annual number of cases by offense category, Figure B the annual number of cases by year and gender (left axis) as well as the annual 
share of female defendants (right axis). Figures C and D show the average annual number of cases and the average share of female defendants (both averaged over 5-
year intervals) for property and violent offenses, respectively. SOURCE - The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
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Figure 2. Sentencing Reforms and Trends in Sentence Types  
A. All offenses 
 
B. Property offenses 
 
C. Violent offenses 
 
NOTE – Figure A shows the annual share of cases by sentence type (conditional on conviction) as well as 
the share of capital-eligible cases for all offense types. Figures B and C show the average annual shares 
(averaged over 5-year intervals) separately for property and violent offenses, respectively. The red vertical 
lines mark the years during the halt of transportation due to the American Revolution (1776-1786) as well 
as the abolition of transportation in 1853 (1857). Offense-specific reforms abolishing capital punishment 
started in 1808. SOURCE - The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
  
32 
 
  
Figure 3. Trends in Conviction Rates and Pleas 
A. All offenses 
 
B. Property offenses 
 
C. Violent offenses 
 
NOTE – Figure A shows the annual share of convictions and pleas for all offense types. Figures B and C 
show the average annual shares (averaged over 5-year intervals) separately for property and violent 
offenses, respectively. SOURCE - The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
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Figure 4. Raw and Adjusted Gender Gaps in Conviction (All Offenses) 
A. Raw gap in jury convictions, any offense  B. Raw gap in jury convictions, original offense  
  
C. Adjusted gap in jury convictions, any offense  D. Adjusted gap in jury convictions, original offense  
  
NOTE – Figure A (B) shows the average annual share of jury convictions of any (original) offense by gender (averaged by decade) as well as the raw gender gap relative 
to the male mean. Figures C and D plot the corresponding adjusted gender gap and 95% confidence interval as well as the raw gender gap. The adjusted gap corresponds 
to the estimated coefficients from equation (1) including controls for gender, number of defendants, capital eligibility and offense fixed effects. SOURCE - The Old 
Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
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Figure 5. Raw Gender Gaps in Sentencing for Property and Violent Offenses 
Panel A. Property offenses     
A1. Capital punishment A2. Transportation A3. Prison A4. Corporal punishment 
    
 
Panel B. Violent offenses  
   
B1. Capital punishment B2. Transportation B3. Prison B4. Corporal punishment 
    
NOTE – The figures show the average share of cases for males (black line) and females (gray line) sentenced to capital punishment (A1/B1), transportation (A2/B2), prison (A3/B3) 
and corporal punishment (A4/B4), each by gender and for property (A) and violent (B) offenses, respectively (averaged by decade and conditional on conviction by jury or plea). 
Offense-specific reforms abolishing capital punishment started in 1808, transportation was step-wise abolished in 1853-57. SOURCE - The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own 
calculations. 
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Figure 6. Adjusted Gender Gaps in Sentencing for Property and Violent Offenses 
Panel A. Property offenses     
A1. Capital punishment A2. Transportation A3. Prison A4. Corporal punishment 
    
 
Panel B. Violent offenses  
   
B1. Capital punishment B2. Transportation B3. Prison B4. Corporal punishment 
    
NOTE – The figures show the adjusted gender gaps (black solid line) and 95% confidence intervals for four different sentencing types, separately for property (A) and violent (B) 
offenses. The adjusted gap corresponds to the estimated coefficients from equation (1) including controls for gender, number of defendants, capital eligibility and offense fixed effects. 
The raw gender gap (blue, open circles, dashed line) is also shown. Figures A1/B1 show the results for capital punishment, A2/B2 for transportation, A3/B3 for prison and A4/B4 for 
corporal punishment (by decade and conditional on conviction). Offense-specific reforms abolishing capital punishment started in 1808, transportation was step-wise abolished in 
1853-57. SOURCE - The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations.  
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Figure 7. Graphical Depiction of Capital Punishment Abolition 
A. Capital punishment 
 
B. Transportation 
 
C. Prison 
 
NOTE – The figure shows the annual share of convicted cases in the treatment (black) and control (grey) 
group that were sentenced to death (Panel A), transportation (Panel B) or prison (Panel C) in the 10 years 
before and after the assigned treatment year, separately by gender (solid: female; dashed: male). The 
treatment group contains those offenses for which capital punishment is abolished, and the control group 
those that are never or always capital eligible. The vertical line marks the offense specific year of abolition 
of capital punishment for offenses in the treatment group. The reform period for the control group is a 
weighted average by the share of reforms in each treatment year. SOURCE - The Old Bailey Proceedings 
Online and own calculations
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  1715-1900 1765-1795 1803-1971 1845-1860 
    all male female male female male female male female            
Trial Characteristics N 192,701 148,314 43,736 23,503 9,346 91,598 25,756 41,336 10,503 
capital mean 0.215 0.205 0.247 0.466 0.408 0.145 0.151 0.008 0.010 
property off. mean 0.751 0.731 0.820 0.811 0.917 0.791 0.821 0.684 0.687 
violent off. mean 0.107 0.118 0.068 0.116 0.042 0.083 0.058 0.117 0.095 
sex off. mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
fraud off. mean 0.118 0.124 0.096 0.046 0.030 0.109 0.111 0.176 0.204 
special off. mean 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.012 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 
other off. mean 0.021 0.022 0.016 0.015 0.009 0.015 0.009 0.022 0.014 
plea mean 0.129 0.146 0.073 0.005 0.003 0.151 0.098 0.273 0.188 
guilty (plea + guilty by jury) mean 0.722 0.744 0.649 0.622 0.555 0.777 0.709 0.801 0.738            
           
Verdict Conditional on Jury Trial N  167,796 126,709 40,546 23,378 9,318 77,783 23,226 30,047 8,532 
guilty by jury mean 0.681 0.700 0.621 0.620 0.554 0.738 0.678 0.726 0.677 
guilty by jury, original charge mean 0.586 0.615 0.498 0.500 0.391 0.689 0.624 0.682 0.644 
guilty by jury, lesser charge mean 0.099 0.088 0.131 0.379 0.446 0.262 0.322 0.273 0.322 
acquitted by jury mean 0.318 0.299 0.378 0.127 0.178 0.050 0.057 0.044 0.033 
guilty with recommendation for mercy mean 0.060 0.059 0.062 0.026 0.019 0.079 0.093 0.080 0.100            
           
Sentences Conditional on Conviction or Plea N 135,568 107,543 27,624 14,348 5,057 69,650 17,827 32,165 7,509 
death penalty mean 0.069 0.075 0.047 0.196 0.076 0.051 0.034 0.003 0.002 
transportation mean 0.301 0.295 0.326 0.463 0.432 0.305 0.257 0.166 0.115 
prison mean 0.511 0.519 0.480 0.136 0.206 0.554 0.613 0.796 0.836 
corporal punishment mean 0.043 0.042 0.046 0.110 0.157 0.035 0.003 0.008 0.000 
harshest punishment mean 0.523 0.552 0.408 0.549 0.407 0.461 0.352 0.480 0.365 
NOTE – The table shows summary statistics for the variables in the whole sample and subsamples by time period. Where not otherwise specified, the mean of the variable is 
shown. SOURCE - The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations.  
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Table 2. Offenses with High and Low Share Female Defendants (1715-1900) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
off. N share female coeff. s.e. relative gap 
Jury conviction of any charge  
Shoplifting 3,460 0.455 -0.0351** (0.0148) -0.043 
Receiving 8,510 0.293 -0.0952*** (0.0119) -0.193 
Coining offenses 8,713 0.282 -0.0726*** (0.0100) -0.092 
Pickpocketing 14,021 0.27 -0.1917*** (0.0090) -0.243 
Larceny 66,244 0.264 -0.0662*** (0.0040) -0.089 
Theft from place 14,628 0.261 -0.0776*** (0.0089) -0.108 
Arson 463 0.248 -0.0650 (0.0620) -0.151 
Stealing from Master 7,322 0.233 0.0301** (0.0121) 0.044 
Perjury 1,110 0.205 -0.0146 (0.0403) -0.046 
Murder 2,095 0.179 -0.1700*** (0.0291) -0.291 
Manslaughter 1,822 0.178 -0.0688** (0.0294) -0.183 
Bigamy 1,017 0.171 -0.1777*** (0.0393) -0.255 
Wounding 4,262 0.161 -0.0412** (0.0188) -0.058 
Perverting justice 488 0.159 -0.0415 (0.0726) -0.069 
Housebreaking 3,662 0.131 -0.1548*** (0.0234) -0.203 
Robbery 10,615 0.131 -0.0663*** (0.0143) -0.109 
Libel 321 0.104 -0.0647 (0.1121) -0.123 
Fraud 4,123 0.0906 -0.0585** (0.0260) -0.089 
Forgery 3,613 0.0827 -0.0795*** (0.0291) -0.137 
Burglary 9,452 0.0733 -0.2064*** (0.0180) -0.294 
Assault 773 0.0674 -0.0597 (0.0736) -0.099 
Return from transportation 313 0.0514 0.0326 (0.1353) 0.041 
Riot 228 0.048 0.2431* (0.1387) 0.484 
NOTE – The table shows the estimated coefficients when regressing the outcome (jury conviction for any charge) 
on a dummy for female defendants, by detailed offense. Column (1) lists the offense; column (2) shows the number 
of observations (1715-1900), column (3) the share females, column (4) the estimated coefficient, column (5) the 
standard error and column (6) the gap relative to the male mean. The regressions include observable controls (see 
Table 3) without offense fixed effects. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
*p<0.1 
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Table 3. Regression Adjusted Gender Gaps: Observables and Unobservables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Sample: 1715-1900 >1832 1751-1810 1751-1822 >=1800 
Spec.: no ctrls. obs. ctrls. obs. ctrls. +crim. hist. obs. ctrls. +wordcount ctrl. obs. ctrls. +jury/judge f.e. obs. ctrls. +age ctrl. 
Panel A. Jury conviction of any charge 
Female -0.0790*** -0.0803*** -0.0693*** -0.0544*** -0.0827*** -0.0763*** -0.0878*** -0.0818***   
  (0.0176) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0131) (0.0191) (0.0171) (0.0164) (0.0181)     
Panel B. Jury conviction of original charge 
Female -0.1170*** -0.0979*** -0.0700*** -0.0552*** -0.1075*** -0.1008*** -0.1082*** -0.1026***   
  (0.0210) (0.0145) (0.0165) (0.0139) (0.0085) (0.0069) (0.0130) (0.0145)     
Panel C. Jury conviction of any charge or guilty by plea 
Female -0.0950*** -0.0835*** -0.0750*** -0.0653*** -0.0835*** -0.0773*** -0.0883*** -0.0822***   
  (0.0186) (0.0157) (0.0141) (0.0122) (0.0188) (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0184)     
Panel D. Sentenced to death 
Female -0.0274 -0.0234 -0.0041 -0.0042 -0.0319 -0.0245 -0.0266 -0.0261 -0.0107 -0.0111 
  (0.0181) (0.0142) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0263) (0.0224) (0.0201) (0.0186) (0.0064) (0.0069) 
Panel E. Sentenced to transportation 
Female 0.0309 -0.0398 -0.0424** -0.0369** -0.0906*** -0.0913*** -0.0842*** -0.0849*** -0.0489** -0.0483** 
  (0.0316) (0.0286) (0.0180) (0.0165) (0.0293) (0.0265) (0.0280) (0.0240) (0.0224) (0.0195) 
Panel F. Sentenced to prison  
Female -0.0392 0.0468** 0.0282 0.0240 0.0579*** 0.0553*** 0.0843*** 0.0849*** 0.0567** 0.0476** 
  (0.0255) (0.0182) (0.0215) (0.0197) (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0076) (0.0064) (0.0248) (0.0184) 
Panel G. Sentenced to corporal punishment 
Female 0.0042 -0.0097** -0.0097*** -0.0097*** 0.0454*** 0.0439*** -0.0099 -0.0105* -0.0321*** -0.0283*** 
  (0.0048) (0.0042) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0059) (0.0050) (0.0110) (0.0087) 
Observations           
Panels A-B 167 255 167 255 72 861 72 861 13 372 13 372 56 777 54 711   
Panel C 192 050 192 050 95 886 95 886 13 415 13 415 57 657 55 251   
Panels D-G 135 167 135 167 72 231 72 231 8 126 8 126 36 787 35 648 108 497 101 667 
NOTE –The table shows the estimated coefficients when regressing the outcome (verdicts in panels A-C and sentences conditional on conviction in panels D to G) on a dummy for female 
defendants, corresponding to estimating equation (1). Columns (1) and (2) show the results for the whole sample period with/without observable controls (number defendants, capital eligibility, 
detailed offense category and year fixed effects). Column (4) adds a control variable for criminal history, column (6) jury and judge fixed effects (without year fixed effects), column (8) a control 
for the trial report word count (scaled by 100) and column (10) a quadratic function in age (only available for convicted defendants). To ease comparison, columns (3), (5), (7) and (9) show the 
corresponding results with the baseline observable controls for each available sample period, respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered at the offense level and shown in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 4. Shift in Punishment Regimes - American Revolution (1765-1795) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Outcome: Jury conviction Judge sentence 
  any charge original charge lesser charge death transportation prison corporal 
 
Panel A. All offenses 
Post 76-86  -0.0293 -0.0001 -0.0393 0.0075 -0.2367*** 0.1156*** 0.1360*** 
 (0.0332) (0.0140) (0.0301) (0.0334) (0.0724) (0.0373) (0.0416) 
Post 87-95 -0.0503* -0.0151 -0.0435 -0.0042 -0.4024*** 0.1107*** 0.0436*** 
 (0.0285) (0.0245) (0.0438) (0.0357) (0.0698) (0.0281) (0.0108) 
Female -0.0899*** -0.1190*** 0.0356** -0.0297 -0.0004 -0.0242* 0.0529*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0111) (0.0130) (0.0272) (0.0617) (0.0123) (0.0177) 
Post 76-86 x Fem. 0.0180 0.0025 0.0138 -0.0297 -0.1960*** 0.1358*** 0.0728*** 
    (0.0158) (0.0143) (0.0158) (0.0206) (0.0572) (0.0399) (0.0136) 
Post 87-95 x Fem. 0.0169 0.0579*** -0.0391** 0.0248 -0.0395 0.1417*** -0.1311*** 
    (0.0180) (0.0127) (0.0145) (0.0228) (0.0326) (0.0390) (0.0439) 
N 21,164 21,164 21,164 12,145 12,145 12,145 12,145 
Cluster 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
 
Panel B. Property offenses 
Post 76-86 -0.0134 0.0216*** -0.0461 0.0030 -0.2624*** 0.1289*** 0.1551*** 
 (0.0353) (0.0057) (0.0366) (0.0376) (0.0748) (0.0359) (0.0384) 
Post 87-95 -0.0670** -0.0221 -0.0534 0.0161 -0.4183*** 0.1168*** 0.0433*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0249) (0.0519) (0.0421) (0.0694) (0.0275) (0.0093) 
Female -0.0874*** -0.1077*** 0.0264 -0.0233 -0.0374 -0.0109 0.0632*** 
 (0.0187) (0.0101) (0.0141) (0.0246) (0.0493) (0.0080) (0.0153) 
Post 76-86 x Fem. 0.0145 -0.0072 0.0211 -0.0237 -0.1470** 0.1093** 0.0610*** 
    (0.0170) (0.0173) (0.0184) (0.0241) (0.0461) (0.0334) (0.0147) 
Post 87-95 x Fem. 0.0089 0.0433*** -0.0328 0.0204 -0.0137 0.1448*** -0.1500*** 
    (0.0189) (0.0118) (0.0181) (0.0232) (0.0295) (0.0410) (0.0406) 
N 17,575 17,575 17,575 10,313 10,313 10,313 10,313 
Cluster 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
 
Panel C. Violent offenses 
Post 76-86 0.0274 0.0043 0.0303 0.0241 -0.1098*** 0.0453 0.0051 
 (0.1258) (0.0138) (0.1393) (0.0593) (0.0184) (0.0291) (0.0052) 
Post 87-95 -0.0076 0.0165 -0.0213 0.0116 -0.3329*** 0.1301 -0.0003 
 (0.1319) (0.0094) (0.1561) (0.0511) (0.0620) (0.0636) (0.0031) 
Female -0.0173 -0.1412** 0.1296 -0.2509 0.2383 -0.0153 0.0026 
 (0.0497) (0.0346) (0.0707) (0.1292) (0.1220) (0.0284) (0.0042) 
Post 76-86 x Fem. -0.0229 0.0200 -0.0503 0.0153 -0.1336 0.0823 0.0801*** 
 (0.0391) (0.0464) (0.0621) (0.1388) (0.1049) (0.0756) (0.0035) 
Post 87-95 x Fem.  0.0138 0.0928** -0.0625 0.1790 -0.1678 -0.0001 0.0010 
 (0.0576) (0.0291) (0.0747) (0.1220) (0.1078) (0.0074) (0.0018) 
N 2,281 2,281 2,281 1,138 1,138 1,138 1,138 
Cluster 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
NOTE – The table shows the results corresponding to estimating equation (2) for the sample period 1765-1795. The dependent 
variable is indicated at the top of each column (verdicts in columns (1) to (3) and sentences in columns (4) to (7)). The 
regressions control for the number of defendants, detailed offense category and year fixed effects. Panel A shows the results 
for all offenses, Panel B for property and Panel C for violent offenses, respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the offense level and shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 5. The Abolition of Capital Punishment (1803-1871) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Outcome: Jury conviction Judge sentence 
  any charge original charge lesser charge death transportation prison corporal 
 
Panel A. All offenses 
Noncapital 0.0809* 0.1693*** -0.0932** -0.4138*** 0.1941** 0.0927** 0.0554*** 
 (0.0439) (0.0377) (0.0390) (0.0792) (0.0733) (0.0352) (0.0139) 
Female -0.0649*** -0.1064*** 0.0530*** -0.1121*** -0.0052 0.0977*** -0.0217*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0178) (0.0169) (0.0390) (0.0440) (0.0227) (0.0049) 
Noncapital  -0.0032 0.0320 -0.0465** 0.1165*** -0.0548 -0.0353 -0.0156 
   x Female (0.0219) (0.0254) (0.0179) (0.0402) (0.0533) (0.0336) (0.0122) 
N 101,009 101,009 101,009 87,477 87,477 87,477 87,477 
Cluster 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
 
Panel B. Property offenses 
Noncapital 0.0204 0.1630*** -0.1502*** -0.3770*** 0.2035* 0.0505* 0.0493*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0448) (0.0372) (0.0962) (0.0900) (0.0269) (0.0114) 
Female -0.0758*** -0.1192*** 0.0563*** -0.1110* -0.0117 0.1080*** -0.0281*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0188) (0.0156) (0.0530) (0.0539) (0.0245) (0.0050) 
Noncapital  0.0017 0.0390 -0.0500** 0.1172* -0.0567 -0.0359 -0.0163 
   x Female (0.0242) (0.0299) (0.0174) (0.0542) (0.0632) (0.0366) (0.0111) 
N 81,504 81,504 81,504 70,776 70,776 70,776 70,776 
Cluster 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
 
Panel C. Violent offenses 
Noncapital 0.1857* 0.1222 0.0793 -0.8181*** -0.0081 0.6954*** 0.0216*** 
 (0.0807) (0.0807) (0.1367) (0.0531) (0.0370) (0.0951) (0.0043) 
Female -0.1217** -0.1391*** 0.0264 -0.1471** 0.0974 0.0239** 0.0019 
 (0.0414) (0.0162) (0.0429) (0.0391) (0.0544) (0.0065) (0.0019) 
Noncapital  0.1158** 0.1150*** -0.0091 0.1321** -0.1165* 0.0174 -0.0156 
   x Female (0.0329) (0.0126) (0.0415) (0.0416) (0.0521) (0.0148) (0.0118) 
N 8,702 8,702 8,702 5,578 5,578 5,578 5,578 
Cluster 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
NOTE – The table shows the results corresponding to estimating equation (3) for the sample period 1803-1871. The dependent 
variable is indicated at the top of each column (verdicts in columns (1) to (3) and sentences in columns (4) to (7)). The 
regressions control for the number of defendants, detailed offense category and year fixed effects. Panel A shows the results 
for all offenses, Panel B for property and Panel C for violent offenses, respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the offense level and shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 6. The Abolition of Transportation (1845-1860) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Outcome: Jury conviction  Judge sentence 
  any charge original charge lesser charge death transportation prison corporal 
 
Panel A. All offenses 
Post 1853 -0.0089 -0.0024 -0.0065 0.0028 -0.2689*** 0.2463*** -0.0022 
 (0.0315) (0.0390) (0.0160) (0.0022) (0.0488) (0.0504) (0.0021) 
Female -0.0529** -0.0541** 0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0705*** 0.0473** -0.0100*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0243) (0.0047) (0.0013) (0.0167) (0.0210) (0.0020) 
Post 1853 x Female -0.0307 -0.0335 0.0029 -0.0022 0.0781*** -0.0782*** 0.0098*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0246) (0.0090) (0.0027) (0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0016) 
N 18,591 18,591 18,591 19,875 19,875 19,875 19,875 
Cluster 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
 
Panel B. Property offenses 
Post 1853 -0.0322 -0.0348 0.0025 -0.0002 -0.3022*** 0.2832*** -0.0049* 
 (0.0421) (0.0519) (0.0189) (0.0002) (0.0641) (0.0627) (0.0024) 
Female -0.0571 -0.0609 0.0038 -0.0002 -0.0702*** 0.0473 -0.0128*** 
 (0.0319) (0.0334) (0.0050) (0.0002) (0.0206) (0.0269) (0.0010) 
Post 1853 x Female -0.0398 -0.0482 0.0085 0.0019 0.0707* -0.0867** 0.0112*** 
 (0.0281) (0.0375) (0.0186) (0.0023) (0.0349) (0.0355) (0.0012) 
N 11,866 11,866 11,866 13,380 13,380 13,380 13,380 
Cluster 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
 
Panel C. Violent offenses 
Post 1853 0.0846 0.1744*** -0.0898** 0.0148 -0.2264 0.1873 -0.0007 
 (0.0615) (0.0350) (0.0319) (0.0159) (0.1311) (0.1617) (0.0005) 
Female -0.0517 -0.0432 -0.0085 -0.0001 -0.0611* 0.0454** -0.0011 
 (0.0539) (0.0414) (0.0364) (0.0158) (0.0235) (0.0134) (0.0009) 
Post 1853 x Female -0.0087 -0.0145 0.0058 -0.0233 -0.0285 0.0470 0.0007 
 (0.0238) (0.0512) (0.0394) (0.0243) (0.0512) (0.0537) (0.0005) 
N 2,546 2,546 2,546 1,887 1,887 1,887 1,887 
Cluster 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
NOTE – The table shows the results corresponding to estimating equation (4) for the sample period 1845-1860. The dependent 
variable is indicated at the top of each column (verdicts in columns (1) to (3) and sentences in columns (4) to (7)). The 
regressions control for the number of defendants, capital eligibility, detailed offense category and year fixed effects. Panel A 
shows the results for all offenses, Panel B for property and Panel C for violent offenses, respectively. Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the offense level and shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 7. Prosecution Witnesses (1800-1810) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Specification: baseline + control + control + interaction + interaction 
            
Jury conviction of any charge       
Female -0.0851*** -0.0852*** -0.0835*** -0.0104 -0.0118 
 (0.0172) (0.0181) (0.0178) (0.0130) (0.0126) 
Any witness  0.7067***  0.7304***  
  (0.0507)  (0.0494)  
Female x any witness    -0.0821***  
    (0.0204)  
One witness   0.5905***  0.6325*** 
   (0.0766)  (0.0833) 
Two or more witnesses   0.7187***  0.7393*** 
   (0.0509)  (0.0488) 
Female x one witness     -0.1309*** 
     (0.0304) 
Female x two or more witnesses     -0.0719*** 
     (0.0226) 
            
            
Observations 3,480 3,480 3,480 3,480 3,480 
            
NOTE – The table shows the estimated coefficients when regressing the outcome (jury conviction of any charge) 
on a dummy for female defendants using the sample including information on the number of prosecution witnesses. 
The sample includes the February, May and September sessions for the years 1800 to 1810. Column (1) includes 
observable controls (see Table 3), column (2) and (3) control for the presence of any or one and two and more 
witnesses, respectively, and column (4) and (5) allows for interactions of that measure with the female dummy 
variable. Robust standard errors are clustered at the offense level and shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
*p<0.1 
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Appendix Figure 1.  Raw and Adjusted Gender Gaps in Conviction (Property Crimes) 
 
A. Raw gap in jury convictions, any offense  B. Raw gap in jury convictions, original offense  
  
C. Adjusted gap in jury convictions, any offense  D. Adjusted gap in jury convictions, original offense  
  
NOTE – Figure A (B) shows the average annual share of jury convictions of any (original) offense by gender (averaged by decade) as well as the raw gender gap relative 
to the male mean. Figures C and D plot the corresponding adjusted gender gap and 95% confidence interval as well as the raw gender gap. The adjusted gap corresponds 
to the estimated coefficients from equation (1) including controls for gender, number of defendants, capital eligibility and offense fixed effects. The sample is restricted 
to property crimes only. SOURCE - The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
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Appendix Figure 2.  Raw and Adjusted Gender Gaps in Conviction (Violent Crimes) 
 
A. Raw gap in jury convictions, any offense  B. Raw gap in jury convictions, original offense  
  
C. Adjusted gap in jury convictions, any offense  D. Adjusted gap in jury convictions, original offense  
  
NOTE – Figure A (B) shows the average annual share of jury convictions of any (original) offense by gender (averaged by decade) as well as the raw gender gap relative to the 
male mean. Figures C and D plot the corresponding adjusted gender gap and 95% confidence interval as well as the raw gender gap. The adjusted gap corresponds to the 
estimated coefficients from equation (1) including controls for gender, number of defendants, capital eligibility and offense fixed effects. The sample is restricted to violent 
crimes only. SOURCE - The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
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Appendix Figure 3. Number of Cases and Share of Female Defendants – Selected Offenses 
 
A. Larceny B. Pickpocketing C. Receiving D. Theft from Place 
    
 
E. Burglary 
 
F. Fraud 
 
G. Murder 
 
H. Robbery 
    
 
NOTE – See Figure 1, Panels C and D. The figures show the corresponding figures for selected detailed offenses and averaged over decades instead of 5-year intervals. The 
solid and dashed black lines are the number of female and male cases, respectively. The dotted gray line is the share of female defendants.
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Appendix Figure 4. Share of Female Defendants versus Raw Conviction Gaps by Offense Category 
A. Larceny B. Pickpocketing C. Receiving D. Theft from Place 
    
 
E. Burglary 
 
F. Fraud 
 
G. Murder 
 
H. Robbery 
    
 
NOTE – In each figure, the black solid line (left axis) shows the raw gender gap in the average annual share of jury convictions of any offense (averaged by decade) and the grey dotted 
line the average annual share of female defendants across all trials for the specific offense (averaged by decade). Each figure corresponds to a specific offense category as indicated at the 
top of each one of them. SOURCE - The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations.
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Appendix Figure 5. Raw and Adjusted Gender Gaps in Sentencing (All Crimes) 
 
Panel A. Raw gaps     
A1. Capital punishment A2. Transportation A3. Prison A4. Corporal punishment 
    
 
Panel B. Adjusted gaps  
   
B1. Capital punishment B2. Transportation B3. Prison B4. Corporal punishment 
    
NOTE – Panel A shows the average share of cases for males (black line) and females (gray line) sentenced to capital punishment (A1), transportation (A2), prison (A3) and corporal 
punishment (A4), each by gender and for all offenses combined (averaged by decade and conditional on conviction). Panel B shows the adjusted gender gaps (solid black line) and 95% 
confidence intervals for four different sentencing types. The adjusted gap corresponds to the estimated coefficients from equation (1) including controls for gender, number of defendants, 
capital eligibility and offense fixed effects. The raw gender gap (blue, open circles, dashed line) is also shown.  Figures B1 shows the results for capital punishment, B2 for transportation, 
B3 for prison and B4 for corporal punishment (by decade and conditional on conviction). Offense-specific reforms abolishing capital punishment started in 1808, transportation was step-
wise abolished in 1853-57. SOURCE - The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations.
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Appendix Table 1. Sample Creation 
 
Detailed offence category 
(combined) 
Drop N Share 
females 
N Share 
females 
N Share 
females 
N Share 
females 
    1715-1900 1765-1795 1803-1871 1845-1860 
Against crown (major) D1 36 0.22 3 1.00 28 0.00 10 0.00 
Against crown (minor) D1 134 0.05 68 0.00 65 0.00 12 0.17 
Animal theft D2 1281 0.02 579 0.02 2057 0.02 380 0.02 
Arson  289 0.21 21 0.33 127 0.31 72 0.25 
Assault  297 0.06 6 0.17 367 0.07 330 0.06 
Bigamy  980 0.18 42 0.24 525 0.16 227 0.13 
Burglary  4868 0.07 1781 0.08 3901 0.08 1366 0.07 
Coining offences  3341 0.21 401 0.28 4432 0.30 3224 0.33 
Embezzlement D2 544 0.01 5 0.00 2625 0.02 1294 0.03 
Forgery  2530 0.09 240 0.05 1806 0.08 1028 0.07 
Fraud  3174 0.08 199 0.10 1369 0.11 997 0.09 
Housebreaking  1088 0.16 238 0.20 2144 0.13 759 0.09 
Infanticide (combined) D2 471 0.88 25 0.96 252 0.93 140 0.95 
Larceny (combined)  15605 0.33 11355 0.30 40278 0.24 5810 0.21 
Libel  362 0.13 3 0.00 108 0.06 45 0.04 
Mail D2 742 0.03 9 0.00 263 0.01 203 0.02 
Manslaughter  832 0.22 19 0.05 703 0.14 348 0.16 
Missing D3 157 0.21 27 0.07 77 0.18 18 0.11 
Murder  1180 0.18 274 0.08 535 0.18 155 0.32 
Other (combined) D3 3818 0.36 324 0.24 1564 0.15 419 0.14 
Perjury  601 0.23 133 0.17 272 0.19 179 0.17 
Perverting justice  200 0.14 92 0.21 164 0.19 93 0.11 
Pickpocketing  2362 0.38 430 0.56 10398 0.24 2284 0.22 
Rape D2 950 0.02 100 0.04 403 0.01 216 0.00 
Receiving  1964 0.33 1132 0.35 4727 0.27 1433 0.26 
Return from transportation  114 0.10 115 0.03 120 0.03 22 0.00 
Riot  85 0.05 105 0.05 31 0.06 30 0.03 
Robbery (combined)  4879 0.10 1928 0.12 3311 0.16 793 0.20 
Sexual assault (combined) D2 587 0.01 - - 293 0.00 131 0.00 
Shoplifting  1331 0.40 571 0.61 1500 0.45 110 0.27 
Sodomy (combined) D2 611 0.00 18 0.00 185 0.00 154 0.00 
Stealing from master  1042 0.09 - - 5792 0.25 3860 0.24 
Theft from place  4659 0.35 2097 0.33 7477 0.22 1798 0.14 
Wounding   2033 0.14 56 0.00 1494 0.18 1103 0.19 
NOTE - The table shows the number of observations and share of female defendants by time period and offense 
categories. The last column indicates those offenses excluded from the analysis sample due to low observation 
numbers (D1), distinctly male or female offenses by definition or share of female defendants (D2), or because the 
nature of the offense is missing or not distinct (D3). Where applicable, we combine offense categories into one 
bigger category: against the crown – major (petty treason, piracy, seducing allegiance, treason), against the crown 
–minor (religious offenses, seditious libel, seditious words, tax offences), infanticide (concealing a birth, illegal 
abortion, infanticide), larceny (grand larceny, petty larceny, simple larceny), other (bankruptcy, barratry, 
conspiracy, extortion, keeping a brothel, kidnapping, other, threatening behavior, vagabonding), robbery (highway 
robbery, robbery), sexual assault (assault with intent, indecent assault), and sodomy (assault with sodomitical 
intent, sodomy). SOURCE - The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
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Appendix Table 2. Gender Gaps in Convictions and Sentences in 50-Year Intervals 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Sample: 1715-1900 <1751 1751-1800 1801-1850 >1850 
Spec.: no ctrls. obs. ctrls. no ctrls. obs. ctrls. no ctrls. obs. ctrls. no ctrls. obs. ctrls. no ctrls. obs. ctrls. 
Panel A. Jury conviction of any charge 
Female -0.0790*** -0.0803*** -0.1118*** -0.1234*** -0.0646*** -0.0803*** -0.0644*** -0.0688*** -0.0751*** -0.0944*** 
  (0.0176) (0.0155) (0.0312) (0.0278) (0.0142) (0.0127) (0.0199) (0.0192) (0.0240) (0.0131) 
Panel B. Jury conviction of original charge 
Female -0.1170*** -0.0979*** -0.1415*** -0.1168*** -0.1144*** -0.1086*** -0.0718*** -0.0808*** -0.0669** -0.0939*** 
  (0.0210) (0.0145) (0.0305) (0.0157) (0.0184) (0.0084) (0.0234) (0.0217) (0.0323) (0.0178) 
Panel C. Jury conviction of any charge or guilty by plea 
Female -0.0950*** -0.0835*** -0.1139*** -0.1248*** -0.0653*** -0.0811*** -0.0690*** -0.0722*** -0.0880*** -0.0908*** 
  (0.0186) (0.0157) (0.0311) (0.0274) (0.0141) (0.0123) (0.0197) (0.0187) (0.0258) (0.0136) 
Panel D. Sentenced to harshest punishment available 
Female -0.1440*** -0.0743*** -0.1008* -0.0759*** -0.1436*** -0.1026*** -0.0959*** -0.0640** -0.0630* -0.0415** 
  (0.0350) (0.0160) (0.0553) (0.0215) (0.0399) (0.0120) (0.0189) (0.0257) (0.0309) (0.0158) 
Observations           
Panels A-B 129,451 129,451 9,401 9,401 16,655 16,655 70,629 70,629 32,766 32,766 
Panel C 192,050 192,050 15,838 15,838 30,556 30,556 95,318 95,318 50,338 50,338 
Panel D 135,167 135,167 9,401 9,401 17,884 17,884 70,629 70,629 37,253 37,253 
NOTE –The table shows the estimated coefficients when regressing the outcome (verdicts in panels A-C and sentences conditional on conviction in panels D to G) on a dummy for female 
defendants, corresponding to estimating equation (1). Columns (1) and (2) show the results for the whole sample period with/without observable controls (number defendants, capital eligibility, 
detailed offense category and year fixed effects); these are the baseline results shown for ease of comparison. Columns (3) and (4) show the respective results with/without observable controls for 
the sample period before 1751, columns (5) and (6) for 1751-1800, columns (7) and (8) for 1801-1850 and columns (9) and (10) for the sample period after 1850. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the offense level and shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 3. The Importance of Feme Covert in Explaining Gender Gaps 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Defendants: Single Multiple Multiple Multiple Multiple Two Two 
Gender: All All Same Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed 
     case f.e. case f.e. case f.e. 
            same name diff. name 
Panel A. Jury conviction of any charge - all offenses 
Female -0.0613*** -0.1293*** -0.1010*** -0.1291*** -0.1185*** -0.1772*** -0.0661 
  (0.0173) (0.0143) (0.0184) (0.0234) (0.0323) (0.0298) (0.0399) 
Panel B. Jury conviction of original charge - all offenses 
Female -0.0810*** -0.1399*** -0.1227*** -0.1178*** -0.1063*** -0.1493*** -0.0618** 
  (0.0150) (0.0140) (0.0193) (0.0171) (0.0226) (0.0362) (0.0279) 
Panel C. Jury conviction of any charge - property offenses 
Female -0.0629** -0.1418*** -0.1101*** -0.1477*** -0.1429*** -0.2023*** -0.0842 
  (0.0211) (0.0177) (0.0223) (0.0278) (0.0372) (0.0109) (0.0489) 
Panel D. Jury conviction of original charge - property offenses 
Female -0.0785*** -0.1445*** -0.1217*** -0.1284*** -0.1225*** -0.1633*** -0.0782** 
  (0.0165) (0.0196) (0.0229) (0.0208) (0.0262) (0.0325) (0.0323) 
Observations        
Panels A-B 111,892 55,363 44,295 11,068 11,068 1,998 4,364 
Panels C-D 86,671 41,091 33,335 7,756 7,756 1,469 3,134 
NOTE – The table shows estimated coefficients when regressing the outcome (verdicts) on a dummy for female defendants, 
corresponding to estimating equation (1). Panel A and B show the results for all offenses and Panels C and D for property offenses, 
respectively. Column (1) is restricted to single defendants, (2) – (5) to multiple defendants and (6) – (7) to two defendant cases. 
Column (3) is restricted to same gender cases, (4) – (7) to mixed gender cases. Columns (5) – (7) include case fixed effects; (6) 
includes cases with defendants of the same surname, (7) of different surnames. All regressions include observable controls (see 
Table 3), except for when including case fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the offense level and shown in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 4. Shift in Punishment Regimes (American Revolution) – Robust Standard Errors 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Outcome: Jury conviction Judge sentence 
  any charge original charge lesser charge death transportation prison corporal 
 
Panel A. All offenses 
Post 76-86  -0.0293 -0.0001 -0.0393** 0.0075 -0.2367*** 0.1156*** 0.1360*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0263) (0.0189) (0.0182) (0.0276) (0.0140) (0.0180) 
Post 87-95 -0.0503* -0.0151 -0.0435** -0.0042 -0.4024*** 0.1107*** 0.0436*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0296) (0.0201) (0.0211) (0.0325) (0.0202) (0.0161) 
Female -0.0899*** -0.1190*** 0.0356*** -0.0297*** -0.0004 -0.0242*** 0.0529*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0126) (0.0096) (0.0080) (0.0156) (0.0029) (0.0122) 
Post 76-86 x Fem. 0.0180 0.0025 0.0138 -0.0297** -0.1960*** 0.1358*** 0.0728*** 
    (0.0173) (0.0167) (0.0126) (0.0118) (0.0184) (0.0158) (0.0183) 
Post 87-95 x Fem. 0.0169 0.0579*** -0.0391*** 0.0248* -0.0395 0.1417*** -0.1311*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0199) (0.0132) (0.0141) (0.0259) (0.0172) (0.0157) 
N 21,164 21,164 21,164 12,145 12,145 12,145 12,145 
 
Panel B. Property offenses 
Post 76-86  -0.0134 0.0216 -0.0461** 0.0030 -0.2624*** 0.1289*** 0.1551*** 
 (0.0278) (0.0279) (0.0206) (0.0170) (0.0289) (0.0143) (0.0202) 
Post 87-95 -0.0670** -0.0221 -0.0534** 0.0161 -0.4183*** 0.1168*** 0.0433** 
 (0.0316) (0.0315) (0.0220) (0.0206) (0.0355) (0.0207) (0.0179) 
Female -0.0874*** -0.1077*** 0.0264*** -0.0233*** -0.0374** -0.0109*** 0.0632*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0131) (0.0101) (0.0076) (0.0160) (0.0022) (0.0129) 
Post 76-86 x Fem. 0.0145 -0.0072 0.0211 -0.0237** -0.1470*** 0.1093*** 0.0610*** 
    (0.0182) (0.0177) (0.0137) (0.0113) (0.0191) (0.0170) (0.0198) 
Post 87-95 x Fem. 0.0089 0.0433** -0.0328** 0.0204 -0.0137 0.1448*** -0.1500*** 
 (0.0217) (0.0210) (0.0140) (0.0137) (0.0278) (0.0183) (0.0172) 
N 17,575 17,575 17,575 10,313 10,313 10,313 10,313 
 
Panel C. Violent offenses 
Post 76-86  0.0274 0.0043 0.0303 0.0241 -0.1098 0.0453* 0.0051 
 (0.1065) (0.0993) (0.0839) (0.1286) (0.1208) (0.0237) (0.0152) 
Post 87-95 -0.0076 0.0165 -0.0213 0.0116 -0.3329*** 0.1301 -0.0003 
 (0.1338) (0.1271) (0.0917) (0.1628) (0.1143) (0.0820) (0.0021) 
Female -0.0173 -0.1412** 0.1296** -0.2509*** 0.2383*** -0.0153 0.0026 
 (0.0649) (0.0563) (0.0566) (0.0907) (0.0779) (0.0163) (0.0016) 
Post 76-86 x Fem. -0.0229 0.0200 -0.0503 0.0153 -0.1336 0.0823* 0.0801** 
    (0.0818) (0.0731) (0.0669) (0.1116) (0.0915) (0.0498) (0.0380) 
Post 87-95 x Fem. 0.0138 0.0928 -0.0625 0.1790 -0.1678 -0.0001 0.0010 
 (0.0893) (0.0813) (0.0703) (0.1184) (0.1056) (0.0223) (0.0017) 
N 2,281 2,281 2,281 1,138 1,138 1,138 1,138 
NOTE – See Table 4. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 5. Abolition of Capital Punishment - Robust Standard Errors 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Outcome: Jury conviction Judge sentence 
  any charge original charge lesser charge death transportation prison corporal 
 
Panel A. All offenses 
Noncapital 0.0809*** 0.1693*** -0.0932*** -0.4138*** 0.1941*** 0.0927*** 0.0554*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0069) (0.0040) (0.0053) (0.0074) (0.0065) (0.0025) 
Female -0.0649*** -0.1064*** 0.0530*** -0.1121*** -0.0052 0.0977*** -0.0217*** 
 (0.0089) (0.0090) (0.0074) (0.0102) (0.0111) (0.0100) (0.0024) 
Noncapital  -0.0032 0.0320*** -0.0465*** 0.1165*** -0.0548*** -0.0353*** -0.0156*** 
   x Female (0.0096) (0.0097) (0.0075) (0.0102) (0.0116) (0.0107) (0.0026) 
N 101,009 101,009 101,009 87,477 87,477 87,477 87,477 
 
Panel B. Property offenses 
Noncapital 0.0204*** 0.1630*** -0.1502*** -0.3770*** 0.2035*** 0.0505*** 0.0493*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0079) (0.0048) (0.0059) (0.0085) (0.0074) (0.0028) 
Female -0.0758*** -0.1192*** 0.0563*** -0.1110*** -0.0117 0.1080*** -0.0281*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0106) (0.0089) (0.0114) (0.0130) (0.0119) (0.0031) 
Noncapital  0.0017 0.0390*** -0.0500*** 0.1172*** -0.0567*** -0.0359*** -0.0163*** 
   x Female (0.0108) (0.0112) (0.0089) (0.0114) (0.0136) (0.0126) (0.0033) 
N 81,504 81,504 81,504 70,776 70,776 70,776 70,776 
 
Panel C. Violent offenses 
Noncapital 0.1857*** 0.1222*** 0.0793*** -0.8181*** -0.0081 0.6954*** 0.0216*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0282) (0.0196) (0.0317) (0.0265) (0.0361) (0.0043) 
Female -0.1217*** -0.1391*** 0.0264 -0.1471*** 0.0974*** 0.0239 0.0019 
 (0.0248) (0.0218) (0.0196) (0.0373) (0.0337) (0.0263) (0.0044) 
Noncapital  0.1158*** 0.1150*** -0.0091 0.1321*** -0.1165*** 0.0174 -0.0156*** 
   x Female (0.0293) (0.0274) (0.0233) (0.0374) (0.0356) (0.0301) (0.0048) 
N 8,702 8,702 8,702 5,578 5,578 5,578 5,578 
NOTE – See Table 5. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 6. Abolition of Transportation - Robust Standard Errors 
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Outcome: Jury conviction  Judge sentence 
  any charge original charge lesser charge death transportation prison corporal 
 
Panel A. All offenses 
Post 1853 -0.0089 -0.0024 -0.0065 0.0028 -0.2689*** 0.2463*** -0.0022* 
 (0.0208) (0.0215) (0.0093) (0.0024) (0.0110) (0.0137) (0.0012) 
Female -0.0529*** -0.0541*** 0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0705*** 0.0473*** -0.0100*** 
 (0.0099) (0.0100) (0.0035) (0.0010) (0.0077) (0.0087) (0.0010) 
Post 1853 x Female -0.0307* -0.0335* 0.0029 -0.0022 0.0781*** -0.0782*** 0.0098*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0173) (0.0068) (0.0018) (0.0090) (0.0119) (0.0010) 
N 18,591 18,591 18,591 19,875 19,875 19,875 19,875 
 
Panel B. Property offenses 
Post 1853 -0.0322 -0.0348 0.0025 -0.0002 -0.3022*** 0.2832*** -0.0049*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0303) (0.0107) (0.0002) (0.0130) (0.0165) (0.0015) 
Female -0.0571*** -0.0609*** 0.0038 -0.0002 -0.0702*** 0.0473*** -0.0128*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0025) (0.0005) (0.0090) (0.0101) (0.0013) 
Post 1853 x Female -0.0398 -0.0482* 0.0085 0.0019 0.0707*** -0.0867*** 0.0112*** 
 (0.0257) (0.0260) (0.0079) (0.0017) (0.0113) (0.0172) (0.0013) 
N 11,866 11,866 11,866 13,380 13,380 13,380 13,380 
 
Panel C. Violent offenses 
Post 1853 0.0846 0.1744*** -0.0898** 0.0148 -0.2264*** 0.1873*** -0.0007 
 (0.0555) (0.0574) (0.0433) (0.0217) (0.0368) (0.0533) (0.0007) 
Female -0.0517* -0.0432 -0.0085 -0.0001 -0.0611* 0.0454 -0.0011 
 (0.0299) (0.0303) (0.0276) (0.0116) (0.0314) (0.0351) (0.0011) 
Post 1853 x Female -0.0087 -0.0145 0.0058 -0.0233 -0.0285 0.0470 0.0007 
 (0.0462) (0.0475) (0.0383) (0.0166) (0.0376) (0.0469) (0.0007) 
N 2,546 2,546 2,546 1,887 1,887 1,887 1,887 
NOTE – See Table 6. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 7. Shift in Punishment Regimes (American Revolution) - Robustness to Trends 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Outcome: Jury conviction Judge sentence 
  any charge original charge lesser charge death transportation prison corporal 
 
Panel A. No year fixed effects and no trend (all offenses) 
Halt (1776-1786) -0.0015 0.0305** -0.0311*** 0.0231 -0.3998*** 0.2279*** 0.1045** 
 (0.0116) (0.0123) (0.0089) (0.0178) (0.0771) (0.0387) (0.0380) 
Australia (1787-1795) -0.0205 0.0233 -0.0455* -0.0171 -0.1715*** 0.0872*** 0.0326** 
 (0.0120) (0.0228) (0.0264) (0.0134) (0.0585) (0.0197) (0.0143) 
Female -0.0894*** -0.1187*** 0.0361** -0.0304 0.0013 -0.0234* 0.0513*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0102) (0.0130) (0.0279) (0.0628) (0.0127) (0.0174) 
Halt x Female 0.0136 -0.0074 0.0198 -0.0237 -0.2502*** 0.1716*** 0.0684*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0140) (0.0164) (0.0183) (0.0515) (0.0351) (0.0165) 
Australia x Female 0.0182 0.0586*** -0.0384** 0.0251 -0.0586 0.1435*** -0.1359*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0132) (0.0139) (0.0240) (0.0351) (0.0385) (0.0459) 
N 21,164 21,164 21,164 12,145 12,145 12,145 12,145 
 
Panel B. Linear trend (all offenses) 
Halt (1776-1786) 0.0098 0.0108 0.0054 0.0423 -0.5152*** 0.3265*** 0.0746* 
 (0.0095) (0.0090) (0.0121) (0.0345) (0.0785) (0.0410) (0.0376) 
Australia (1787-1795) -0.0006 -0.0114 0.0190 0.0157 -0.3690*** 0.2559*** -0.0186 
 (0.0166) (0.0141) (0.0213) (0.0315) (0.0564) (0.0239) (0.0191) 
Female -0.0896*** -0.1185*** 0.0357** -0.0305 0.0023 -0.0242* 0.0516*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0102) (0.0130) (0.0282) (0.0641) (0.0136) (0.0171) 
Halt x Female 0.0130 -0.0063 0.0178 -0.0248 -0.2437*** 0.1660*** 0.0701*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0142) (0.0169) (0.0189) (0.0539) (0.0370) (0.0157) 
Australia x Female 0.0187 0.0577*** -0.0367** 0.0260 -0.0640* 0.1482*** -0.1373*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0132) (0.0140) (0.0246) (0.0371) (0.0379) (0.0456) 
N 21,164 21,164 21,164 12,145 12,145 12,145 12,145 
 
Panel C. Offense-specific linear trend (all offenses) 
Halt (1776-1786) 0.0078 0.0132 0.0007 0.0449 -0.5287*** 0.3320*** 0.0782** 
 (0.0100) (0.0089) (0.0128) (0.0360) (0.0739) (0.0386) (0.0372) 
Australia (1787-1795) -0.0089 -0.0117 0.0103 0.0237 -0.3917*** 0.2644*** -0.0143 
 (0.0159) (0.0141) (0.0184) (0.0345) (0.0477) (0.0231) (0.0195) 
Female -0.0950*** -0.1144*** 0.0252* -0.0272 -0.0179 -0.0151* 0.0573*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0098) (0.0130) (0.0275) (0.0552) (0.0079) (0.0149) 
Halt x Female 0.0202 -0.0099 0.0297 -0.0295 -0.2177*** 0.1542*** 0.0637*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0142) (0.0184) (0.0207) (0.0416) (0.0306) (0.0132) 
Australia x Female 0.0300 0.0526*** -0.0192 0.0187 -0.0293 0.1328*** -0.1468*** 
 (0.0232) (0.0123) (0.0196) (0.0237) (0.0219) (0.0430) (0.0425) 
N 21,164 21,164 21,164 12,145 12,145 12,145 12,145 
NOTE – The table shows the robustness of the results for all offenses shown in Panel A of Table 4. See the notes of Table 4 for 
details regarding the sample period and baseline specifications. Panel A omits year fixed effects, Panel B includes a linear trend 
(no year fixed effects) and Panel C includes offense-specific linear trends (no year fixed effects). Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the offense level and shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 8. Abolition of Transportation - Robustness to Trends 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Outcome: Jury conviction Judge sentence 
  any charge original charge lesser charge death transportation prison corporal 
 
Panel A. No year fixed effects and no trend (all offenses) 
Post 1853 -0.0151 -0.0085 -0.0066 0.0018 -0.2144*** 0.2054*** -0.0078*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0187) (0.0074) (0.0015) (0.0427) (0.0442) (0.0023) 
Female -0.0520** -0.0535** 0.0014 -0.0000 -0.0702*** 0.0473** -0.0100*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0246) (0.0048) (0.0013) (0.0171) (0.0212) (0.0020) 
Post 1853 x Female -0.0302 -0.0336 0.0034 -0.0023 0.0785** -0.0786** 0.0097*** 
 (0.0210) (0.0249) (0.0089) (0.0028) (0.0281) (0.0288) (0.0016) 
N 18,591 18,591 18,591 19,875 19,875 19,875 19,875 
 
Panel B. Linear trend (all offenses) 
Post 1853 0.0063 0.0086 -0.0023 0.0032 -0.1221*** 0.1130*** -0.0120*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0215) (0.0054) (0.0030) (0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0033) 
Female -0.0524** -0.0537** 0.0014 -0.0000 -0.0702*** 0.0472** -0.0100*** 
 (0.0238) (0.0245) (0.0048) (0.0013) (0.0170) (0.0212) (0.0020) 
Post 1853 x Female -0.0302 -0.0336 0.0034 -0.0024 0.0774** -0.0775** 0.0098*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0250) (0.0089) (0.0028) (0.0277) (0.0280) (0.0017) 
N 18,591 18,591 18,591 19,875 19,875 19,875 19,875 
 
Panel C. Offense-specific linear trend (all offenses) 
Post 1853 0.0016 0.0028 -0.0012 0.0030 -0.1116*** 0.1016*** -0.0124*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0210) (0.0060) (0.0030) (0.0359) (0.0357) (0.0033) 
Female -0.0524** -0.0542** 0.0018 0.0001 -0.0587*** 0.0355 -0.0100*** 
 (0.0236) (0.0242) (0.0048) (0.0013) (0.0174) (0.0221) (0.0020) 
Post 1853 x Female -0.0304 -0.0325 0.0022 -0.0024 0.0445** -0.0437* 0.0099*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0235) (0.0079) (0.0029) (0.0184) (0.0223) (0.0018) 
N 18,591 18,591 18,591 19,875 19,875 19,875 19,875 
NOTE – The table shows the robustness of the results for all offenses shown in Panel A of Table 6. See the notes of Table 6 for 
details regarding the sample period and baseline specifications. Panel A omits year fixed effects, Panel B includes a linear trend 
(no year fixed effects) and Panel C includes offense-specific linear trends (no year fixed effects). Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the offense level and shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 
